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1. Introduction


Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. This article benefited from the excellent comments of
Sasha Greenawalt and the other attendees of the American Society of International Law International Criminal Law
Interest Group Workshop at John Marshall Law School. Diane Marie Amann, Andy Gillman, and David Glazier
were incredibly generous in their comments, suggestions and criticisms. I am grateful to the U.S. Department of
State for inviting me to present this paper as a Martins Fellow and for the constructive feedback I received. In
addition, Louise Arimatsu and Michael Schmitt provided valuable comments during the editorial stage. The author
is indebted to John Engers, Paul Keating, and Mary Sexton for their research assistance.
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The killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in May 2011 and Anwar al-Aulaqi in Yemen in
September 2011 both raise the question of when the killing of an identified individual posing a
threat to a nation-state is lawful.1 Although it has not yet been forced to publicly defend either
killing in any great detail, the Obama Administration has insisted on the legality of both
operations by deploying an amalgam of legal and rhetorical arguments that explicitly or
implicitly invoke multiple bodies of law. As an administration spokesperson stated in connection
with the Bin Laden operation:
The operation was conducted in a manner fully consistent with the laws of war.
… There is simply no question that this operation was lawful. Bin Laden was the
head of al Qaeda, the organization that conducted the attacks of September 11,
2001. And al Qaeda and bin Laden himself had continued to plot attacks against
the US. We acted in the nation’s self-defense. The operation was conducted in a
way designed to minimize and avoid altogether, if possible, civilian casualties.2
In litigation brought by al-Aulaqi’s father in 2010, the Administration likewise argued both that
Congress authorized the President to use force overseas to protect the U.S. from threats of attack
and that additional legal authority comes from, inter alia, the inherent right of national selfdefense recognized by international law.3
These statements reveal that the legality of such targeted operations can be evaluated along a
number of dimensions—under public international law devoted to the jus ad bellum, under
international humanitarian law and the jus in bello, under international human rights law, and
under the applicable domestic legal regimes. Of particular relevance in U.S. law are two
instruments: the long-standing Executive Order proscribing resort to assassination and the 2001
Authorization to Use Military Force. Common law prohibitions against murder may also apply in
Pakistan and Yemen.
Notwithstanding these multiple legal regimes, there is little positive law that speaks definitively
to the legality vel non of the Bin Laden and al-Aulaqi operations. In particular, the law is not
entirely clear with respect to: the legality of the United States’ use of force in these foreign
territories; the United States’ use of lethal force against these two individuals; the reach of the jus
in bello beyond active theaters of war; and the question of whether the U.S. was under a duty to
endeavor to capture either Bin Laden or al-Aulaqi rather than kill them outright. In light of the
gaps in the law on these fundamental questions, a legal analysis of these operations threatens to
yield a situation of non liquet—“it is not clear.”
Although the relevant legal regimes developed along different historical, doctrinal, and
philosophical trajectories, they increasingly collide and even overlap in contemporary
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. With only rudimentary choice of law tools to
1

To a certain extent, the attack on Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi’s compound in Tripoli in May 2011, days before the
Bin Laden raid, also engages these questions. Van Schaack 2011.
2
White House Press Secretary 2011.
3
Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support of
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Case Civ. A. No. 10-cv-1469, at pp. 4-5 (Sept. 25, 2010) [hereinafter ‘Al-Aulaqi,
Obama brief’], available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Al-Aulaqi_USG_PI_Opp__MTD_Brief_FILED.pdf.
2
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draw upon, it is not yet clear which body of law is authoritative in the event of tensions and
contradictions between them. Because the doctrinal and conflicts of law questions are difficult to
sort out in a vacuum, the definitive legality of such events may turn on which domestic or
international legal forum—if any—ultimately asserts jurisdiction. Judicial review, however, is
not likely to be forthcoming, given that there are limited fora in which to raise any sort of formal
legal challenge, there is no obvious sovereign or individual complainant, there is only limited
personal jurisdiction over potential sovereign and individual respondents, and there are vast
disparities of power between the U.S. and other involved states. As such, where the law is
incomplete or indeterminate, a form of jurisprudential relativity sets in, by which states are free
to make policy choices, subject only to the constraints—none trivial, to be sure—imposed by
military strategy, diplomatic relations, and the political process.4 The multiplicity of legal
regimes also invites a “mixing and matching” of doctrinal elements that blurs the distinctions
between the various paradigms and can lead to doctrinal imbalances.
In the light of the legal indeterminacy surrounding these two operations, this article will
endeavor to systematically tease out the various arguments advanced in their defense and to map
the contiguous and overlapping legal regimes that speak to the killing of these two men. I
compare the legality of the two operations primarily under international law, leaving to others to
develop whatever domestic constitutional limitations may exist by virtue of the 4th and 5th
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The paper outlines several doctrinal pathways within
international law that lead to the conclusion that both operations were legal. Along the way, I
identify established landmarks in positive law. Reaching the ultimate destination, however,
requires one to traverse uncertain terrain by deploying legal theories that remain underdeveloped, in flux, and contested. At these crossroads, the necessary arguments often do not
enjoy textual support in the relevant treaties or reflect consistent state practice or opinio juris.
Nor are there authoritative judicial pronouncements that provide validation. Furthermore, our
expedition requires us to navigate between overlapping legal regimes with no compass to help
resolve potential conflicts of law that arise. In my accounting of this journey, I provide a rather
cursory treatment of established law and linger more at those junctures that could lead to a
conclusion of illegality because there is a diversity of viewpoints in the literature. All told, the
law can be made to work in defense of the United States’ actions, but there are points along the
way at which an authoritative decision-maker might reach a defensible contrary conclusion.
Although this paper is primarily about law, the policy implications of these operations are
momentous.5 And, the “should we” question is often as compelling as the “can we” question.
The U.S. may enjoy a technological monopoly on certain means and methods of warfare for the
moment. Like the proverbial pocket calculator, however, it is only a matter of time before other
states and entities have access to the same tools and techniques, given the dizzying pace of
technological diffusion in war fighting. Any legal claims now employed will be up for grabs for
other states and entities to appropriate.6 And, because polynormativity is unsustainable in any
system of law, the U.S. precedent will be cited as influential state practice and its legal claims as
4

Corn and Jenson 2008, at pp.827-28.
See Blum and Heymann 2010.
6
Reisman and Armstrong 2006, at pp.525-6 (noting the mimetic tendency of customary international law
arguments).
5
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authoritative opinio juris, notwithstanding claims of U.S. exceptionalism. From a policy
perspective, this suggests prudential grounds for caution when operating at the edge of the law.
2. The Operations and Their Justifications
Although the complete details of how Osama bin Laden and Anwar al-Aulaqi met their demise
may never be fully known, it is possible to piece together a composite account by drawing on
press coverage, government legal briefs, and statements from the Obama Administration. The
following narratives assume the accuracy of such public records, bearing in mind that much
relevant information remains classified.
2.1. Operation Neptune Spear: Osama Bin Laden
It has been reported that, in the early hours of May 2, 2011, about two dozen Navy SEALs
departed by helicopter from a base in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, and entered Pakistani sovereign
territory.7 The SEALs were part of the Naval Special Warfare Development Group
(“DEVGRU”) under the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), a subunified component of
the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) dedicated to conducting antiterrorism
operations.8 In two helicopters (MH-60 Black Hawks),9 the team entered the garrison town of
Abbottabad and approached a compound that had been under surveillance for months.10 The
original plan was for members of the team to rappel out of the helicopters and raid the compound
from the roof.11 The plan did not unroll as planned, however, when the high temperatures, tall
security walls, and the thin air of the compound caused one helicopter to “settle with power” and
crash.12 The other helicopter landed, and the SEALs moved toward the buildings in the
compound after blasting through several internal walls with C-4 explosives. Some accounts tell it
that the team immediately took fire from in a peripheral building. The source was Abu Ahmed
al-Kuwaiti, the courier who inadvertently revealed Bin Laden’s whereabouts after a 10-year
manhunt.13 Other accounts suggest that the team was not fired upon until they entered the main
house and confronted Bin Laden’s son, Khalid, who was armed with an AK-47.14 It now appears
that these were the only shots fired against the Americans.15
Upon entering the structure where Bin Laden was thought to be residing, the SEAL team
proceeded to the upper floors, killing Bin Laden’s son on the way up.16 Bin Laden was visually
identified on an upper floor. Although reports originally suggested that Bin Laden had used one

7

Schmidle 2011 (on an apparently “insider” account). See also New York Times 2011a; BBC News 2011.
See generally Feickert 2011. Reports of the Bin Laden raid indicate that while the Pentagon implemented the
operation, it was carried out under CIA authority. Ambinger 2011.
9
It has been surmised that the Pentagon may have developed a stealth helicopter for such missions. Hennigan and
Vartabedian 2011. See also Shalal-Esa 2011.
10
Mazzetti 2011.
11
BBC News 2011.
12
Shalal-Esa 2011.
13
Wilson, Whitlock and Branigan 2011.
14
Schmidle 2011.
15
Landler and Mazzetti 2011.
16
New York Times 2011.
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of his wives as a human shield,17 later accounts suggested that she, her daughter, and/or another
wife may have tried to position themselves in front of him or even rushed at the SEALs.18
Versions of the story were also conflicting as to whether Bin Laden fired at the U.S. troops when
he confronted them;19 now it appears that he resisted capture,20 or seemed ready to resist,21 and
that there were weapons within reach although he was unarmed.22 One of the SEALs shot Bin
Laden in the chest and then the head. All told, four other people were killed in the raid: the
courier, Bin Laden’s son Khalid, the courier’s brother (who was armed), and the latter’s wife
(who was not).23 One of Bin Laden’s wives was later treated for a bullet wound in her leg.24
Accounts suggest that Bin Laden made no effort at surrender.25 That said, some narratives have
suggested that the order was made to kill not capture Bin Laden, perhaps due to the spectacle that
would no doubt have ensued.26 This view has been vociferously contradicted by official
spokespersons, who insist that “consistent with the laws of war, bin Laden’s surrender would
have been accepted if feasible.”27
Meanwhile, a rescue MH-47 Chinook helicopter was dispatched. The SEALs destroyed the
downed helicopter and the troops departed, carrying Bin Laden’s corpse and a voluminous
amount of intelligence with them. After DNA testing confirmed Bin Laden’s identity, his
remains were given Islamic funeral rites and were wrapped in a burial shroud. After the Saudi
government indicated that it did not want the body, Bin Laden’s corpse was dumped into the
Arabian Sea from the aircraft carrier, USS Carl Vinson.28
2.2. Anwar Al-Aulaqi
Al-Aulaqi, a dual U.S.-Yemeni citizen whose parents left the U.S. when he was seven, was an al
Qaida cleric, ideologue, and propagandist.29 Although once a seemingly moderate voice, AlAulaqi’s lectures had increasingly been linked to attacks around the world, such as the violent
rampage by Major Nidal Malik Hasan in Texas, and the attempted Northwest Airlines bombing
by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, both in 2009.30 Originally the editor of Inspire, al Qaida’s
jihadist magazine, al-Aulaqi was alleged to have increasingly assumed an operational role in al

17

Wilson, Whitlock and Branigan 2011.
Drogin, Parsons and Dilanian 2011.
19
The White House Blog 2011 (“After a firefight, they killed Osama bin Laden and took custody of his body.”).
20
Drogin, Parsons and Dilanian 2011.
21
Waraich 2011.
22
Williams 2011.
23
Worldwatch 2011.
24
Wilson, Whitlock and Branigan 2011.
25
Williams 2011 (quoting Attorney General Eric Holder to the effect that “‘If he had attempted to surrender, I think
we should obviously have accepted that, but there was no indication that he wanted to do that. And therefore his
killing was appropriate.’”).
26
See Robertson 2011.
27
White House Press Secretary 2011. See also Drogin, Parsons and Dilanian 2011; Brennan 2011.
28
Drogin, Parsons and Dilanian 2011.
29
New York Times 2011b.
30
Mazzetti, Schmitt and Worth 2011.
18

5

Not for Citation or Attribution. Forthcoming: 14 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2012).

Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)31 by, for example, recruiting members, facilitating
training camps, fundraising, and planning attacks on the U.S.32
Al-Aulaqi had been in U.S. sights for some time. It was reported that he had been placed on a list
of individuals whom the Joint Special Operations Command, tasked with tracking suspected
terrorists, was specifically authorized to kill.33 This list is colloquially called the “kill or capture
list.”34 Since at least April 2010, al-Aulaqi was on a separate list of suspected terrorists whom the
CIA was authorized to kill.35 The Treasury Department also included him on a list of Specially
Designated Global Terrorists suspected of “supporting acts of terrorism and for acting for or on
behalf of AQAP.”36 Pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1267, he was identified as an
individual associated with al Qaida and thus subjected to a global asset freeze and travel ban.37
The revelation that the National Security Council had authorized al-Aulaqi’s killing provoked a
lawsuit by al-Aulaqi’s father and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) seeking injunctive
relief,38 which failed on standing and political question grounds.39
Al-Aulaqi had apparently evaded drone attacks in December 2009 and May 2011.40 He was
finally killed in a remote area of Northern Yemen on September 30, 2011, by a Hellfire missile
fired from a Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) deployed from a base somewhere in the Arabian
Peninsula. The drone was likely operated by the CIA, although some reports suggest
involvement by JSOC.41 Killed along with him was another U.S. citizen, Samir Khan, who also
edited Inspire. There is no indication that the U.S. was aware of Khan’s presence in the convoy
in question, but his death has not been treated solely as collateral damage.42 This was not the first
such operation outside of Afghanistan or a recognized theater of war.43 That distinction goes to
the November 2002 drone attack in Yemen that killed another U.S. citizen, Kamal Derwish
31

On January 19, 2010, Secretary of State Clinton designated AQAP as a Foreign Terrorist Organization pursuant to
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 9 U.S.C. §1189.
32
Shane 2010. See also Al-Aulaqi, Obama brief, supra n.3 at pp.1, 6, 21 (arguing that al-Aulaqi assumed an
“operational leadership role” in AQAP); Al Aulaqi v. Obama et al, Unclassified Declaration in Support of Formal
Claim of State Secrets Privilege by James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, at paras.13-17 (Sept. 24,
2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/statesec/aulaqi-clapper-092510.pdf.
33
Priest 2010.
34
Hosenball 2011.
35
Miller 2010. For a discussion of the legal and policy implications of generating secret “kill or capture” lists,
particularly given the lack of transparency and accountability, see Alston 2011.
36
Designation of Anwar Al-Aulaqi Pursuant to Executive Order 13224 and the Global Terrorism Sanctions
Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 594, 75 Fed. Reg. 43233, 43234 (July 23, 2010). See Fox News 2010.
37
Security Council Resolution 1267, 15 October 1999, S/Res/1267, para.4.
38
Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, Case 1:10-cv-01469, Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Aug. 30, 2010),
available at http://www.aclu.org/national-security/al-aulaqi-v-obama-complaint [hereinafter ‘Al-Aulaqi
Complaint’].
39
Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010).
40
Mazzetti, Schmitt and Worth 2011.
41
Mazzetti, Schmitt and Worth 2011.
42
Hosenball 2011. But see Finn 2011. Collateral damage is defined as “incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians and damage to civilian objects.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
‘API’], art 57(2) (a) (ii).
43
The theater of war, also known as the area of operations, encompasses locations where actual military operations
are taking place. Greenwood 2008, at para.53.
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(a.k.a. Ahmed Hijazi). In that attack, CIA operatives based in Djibouti killed six alleged al Qaida
members, including the individual then considered the head of al Qaida in Yemen.44 These
operations have continued. In October 2011, al-Aulaqi’s teen-aged son, Abdul Rahman AlAulaqi (also an American citizen), and Ibrahim al-Banna, another AQAP media chief, were
killed by a drone.45
2.3. Evolving Narratives and Appraisals
In the evolving narratives of what happened during these two incidents, an amalgam of different
bodies of law, legal rules, and moral principles have been invoked. Official and unofficial
statements by Obama Administration officials concerning these and related operations engage
complex public international law principles concerned with: the legality of the sovereign use of
force extraterritorially; the concept of combatant status and combat function within international
humanitarian law (IHL); the principles of self-defense, distinction, and proportionality; and the
applicability of human rights obligations extraterritorially. In these accounts, it is not clear
wshether a single theory of legality is being advanced, or if there are multiple legal claims that
provide alternative, or perhaps even mutually reinforcing, legal bases. Moreover, where multiple
legal paradigms are invoked, there is a risk of taking the sugar without the salt: relying on
permissive doctrinal elements while overlooking limitations or restrictions that exist to protect
against excesses or abuse.
A primary articulated justification for both operations is “national self-defense.”46 The selfdefense imperative operates to justify both the incursion into Pakistani territory without
Pakistan’s consent (assuming Yemen’s consent to the presence of the drone in question) as well
as the use of lethal force against the two men.47 Even absent any territorial breach, self-defense
has been invoked to provide a continuous targeting authority against individuals associated with
al Qaida who pose a threat to the U.S. and its interests.48 Appealing to self-defense as a public
international law principle, however, requires a more lenient conception of what constitutes an
imminent threat than would be acceptable under classic articulations of the doctrine. This
doctrinal expansion is justified, according to the Administration, because “the threats posed by
non-state actors do not present themselves in the ways that evidenced imminence in more
traditional conflicts.”49 While self-defense has historically been cited in connection with attacks
on hostile governments or military installations, invoking it in connection with these types of
individualized operations outside of a law enforcement context is novel.
A separate rationale also appears in government statements: that both men were lawful military
objectives according to the principle of distinction who were engaged in an armed conflict
against the U.S. that is governed by IHL. In a blog post after the Bin Laden operation, State
Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh stated,
44

Abu Ali Al-Harithi had been associated with the attack on the USS The Sullivans and USS Cole in 2000 in
Yemen. Derwish was suspected of being the ringleader of the Lackawanna Six terrorist cell. McManus 2003.
45
Kasinof 2011.
46
Brennan 2011. See also Koh 2010.
47
Williams 2011.
48
Brennan 2011. But in contrast, see Janin 2007, at p.98.
49
Brennan 2011.
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Given bin Laden’s unquestioned leadership position within al Qaeda and his clear
continuing operational role, there can be no question that he was the leader of an
enemy force and a legitimate target in our armed conflict with al Qaeda.50
The accounts of the Bin Laden mission also emphasize that the IHL principles of distinction and
proportionality were strictly adhered to,51 and that American lives were at risk.52 This latter
observation implies that the U.S. did not prioritize force protection over the principle of
proportionality, which protects civilians from harm. This comment implicitly differentiates this
operation from those involving the use of drones, such as the al-Aulaqi operation, which lack the
element of reciprocity of risk.
Other statements, however, go beyond self-defense and the law of armed conflict and sound
more of revenge and reprisal.53 For example, in the first appearance by an Obama administration
Cabinet official following the Bin Laden operation, Attorney General Eric Holder stated that Bin
Laden:
was the head of al-Qaida, an organization that had conducted the attacks of
September 11th. He admitted his involvement and he indicated that he would not
be taken alive.54
President Obama himself simply noted that “justice has been done.”55
Fewer official details have emerged about the al-Aulaqi operation, as it is still deemed a covert
action. A government spokesperson did describe al-Aulaqi as a leader of, and recruiter for,
AQAP, which has been deemed a threat to the U.S.56 The Justice Department reportedly
produced a detailed memorandum ex ante setting forth the legal bases for placing al-Aulaqi on
the JSOC list of potential targets, but this reasoning has not been publicly released (or
acknowledged).57 The memo apparently grapples with the question of whether the law-of-war
rationale so prominent in the Bin Laden case is equally applicable when dealing with someone
affiliated with an organization formed well after 9/11 with uncertain connections to al Qaida
proper.58 The fact that al-Aulaqi was a U.S. citizen evidently problematized, but did not alter, the
memo’s ultimate conclusion of legality.59
In the most comprehensive articulation of the Obama Administration’s counterterrorism policy
to date, John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism,
reiterated that the U.S. was engaged in a global armed conflict with al Qaida that is not restricted
50

Koh 2011.
Williams 2011
52
White House Press Secretary 2011.
53
Amnesty International 2011.
54
Williams 2011.
55
White House Blog 2011.
56
Tapper 2011.
57
See Finn 2011. As this article was going to press, it was announced that the Obama Administration would reveal
publicly the legal reasoning behind the decision to kill al-Aulaqi. See Klaidman (2012).
58
Cole 2011.
59
Johnson 2011.
51
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to “hot” battlefields, like Afghanistan.60 He emphasized that the “Administration’s
counterterrorism efforts outside of Afghanistan and Iraq are focused on those individuals who
are a threat to the U.S., whose removal would cause a significant—even if only temporary—
disruption of the plans and capabilities of al-Qa’ida and its associated forces.”61 This statement
embodies twin justifications for resorting to lethal force—national defense and the IHL principle
of distinction. It is unclear if these are alternative, or mutually reinforcing rationales, for such
operations.62 If the killings are lawful under IHL, no separate self-defense rationale seems
necessary, except to justify the breach of Pakistani territory.63 Indeed, if IHL is applicable, it is
unclear if a self-defense rationale remains viable or if IHL targeting rules occupy the field under
a theory of lex specialis just as international human rights may be subordinated to IHL in
situations of armed conflict. If IHL is not applicable, the two individuals retained the full force of
their international human rights not to be arbitrarily killed.
Notwithstanding these arguments in favor of the operations’ legality, the attacks raised distinct
international law concerns from other perspectives.64 Some voices from the right and left—
including those from major civil rights organizations—invoked international human rights law
exclusively and went so far as to characterize the operations as extrajudicial killings65 or targeted
assassinations.66 Indeed, Christof Heyns, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary
or Arbitrary Executions, and Martin Sheinin, the then-Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, requested
more details about the Bin Laden operation. In particular, they sought clarification about whether
capture was genuinely contemplated in order to address questions about whether the attack was
legally justifiable and consistent with the United States’ international human rights obligations.67
The al-Aulaqi killing has raised even more dissension in light of his U.S. citizenship, the lack of
certainty about his role in al Qaida and the group’s links to AQAP, and the loose nexus between
the operation and any extant armed conflict.68 Heyns in particular has been quoted as saying,
“the current use of drones and raids into countries where there is not a recognised armed conflict
to kill an opponent, such as in Pakistan or Yemen, is highly problematic.”69
Although academics and human rights organizations voiced these concerns, neither operation
generated full-throated opprobrium from other states.70 Several legal and non-legal explanations
for this apparent sovereign acceptance (or at least acquiescence) suggest themselves. These
60

Brennan 2011.
Brennan 2011.
62
Koh 2010 (“[S]ome have argued that the use of lethal force against specific individuals fails to provide adequate
process and thus constitutes unlawful extrajudicial killing. But a state that is engaged in armed conflict or in
legitimate self-defense is not required to provide targets with legal process before the state may use lethal force.”).
63
Brennan in his Harvard speech reasoned that, “[b]ecause we are engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qa’ida, the
US takes the legal position that—in accordance with international law—we have the authority to take action against
al-Qa’ida and its associated forces without doing a separate self-defense analysis each time.” Brennan 2011.
64
See Lewis 2011.
65
Cohn 2011.
66
Centre for Constitutional Rights 2011.
67
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) – Geneva 2011.
68
Ito 2011.
69
OHCHR – New York 2011.
70
See Wikipedia 2011 (noting that only Hamas, the Taliban, and Venezuela, publicly objected to the killing). See
also Amnesty International 2011b.
61
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include: the realist recognition of the United States’ position in the world as a global superpower,
the feeling of many that both operations reached desirable outcomes, and the attitude that there
may be certain individuals whose conduct is so heinous that they are—in a sense—outside the
law.71 Government elites may feel these actions are either legal, or—if not legal—then
legitimate.72 We may never know, however, whether U.S. officials received a
diplomatic scolding—or more congratulations—outside the public eye.73 Subtle public
references, however, suggest that not all of the United States’ actions have garnered unwavering
support from other nations, even from the country’s closest allies. The former Legal Adviser of
the U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office has, for example, written that the U.S. “sees the
conflict against Al Qaeda as without geographic limit…. Key allies see it differently, as a
conflict geographically limited to ‘hot battlefields.’”74 In any case, there can be no doubt that the
complexity of the international legal questions raised, and the persistent uncertainty about the
relevant law, contributed to the muting of potential critical responses. It is to these issues that I
now turn.
3. Adherence to the Jus ad Bellum
Turning to the operative international law, two bodies of public international law directly
regulate a state’s use of armed force: the jus ad bellum and jus in bello, which govern the right to
use force and the type and degree of force used in an armed conflict, respectively. The
consequences of violating the jus ad bellum are different than those of violating the jus in bello.
The former protects sovereign values, and violations for the moment give rise only to state
responsibility.75 The latter protects individuals and may lead to individual responsibility in
addition to state responsibility.
Starting with the jus ad bellum, both operations prompt a preliminary inquiry into the question of
whether the U.S. was entitled—under international law and domestic law—to employ force in
Pakistan and Yemen, two sovereign countries with which the U.S. is not at war. While regulating
the use of force is a central feature of international law, elements of U.S. domestic law—
including the 1973 War Powers Resolution,76 the 2001 Authorization to Use Force,77 and other
constitutional and statutory provisions allocating the country’s war powers—are also
authoritative.
As discussed below, the jus ad bellum provokes a more searching inquiry with respect to the Bin
Laden operation, given the apparent lack of Pakistani consent to the SEALs’ incursion. By
contrast, the al-Aulaqi operation appears to have had the benefit of Yemen’s consent and perhaps
its involvement. As such, the U.N. Charter-based jus ad bellum is largely silent in this latter
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context.78 By contrast, one reaches crisscrossing conclusions with respect to the legality of the
operation under domestic law. While the Bin Laden operation seems to fall squarely within
AUMF enacted following the September 11th attacks, the al-Aulaqi operation has a more
uncertain domestic-law footing. Even assuming no violation of either territorial state’s
sovereignty, the jus ad bellum provides an uncertain justification for the use of deadly force
against these two men absent a more imminent threat.
3.1. International Law Aspects of the Jus Ad Bellum
The U.N. Charter framework dictates that Article 2(4)’s use of force prohibition is an obligation
erga omnes. The threat of transnational terrorism, however, has given rise to security
imperatives—and concomitant legal arguments—that strain the classic jus ad bellum. This
section recaps the basic tenets of this body of law and evaluates several theories that have been,
or may be, employed to justify the United States’ uses of force in these instances, including
consent, self-defense, and a state of necessity.79 Although a self-defense rationale is ultimately
the most defensible jus-ad-bellum justification for the breach of Pakistan’s territorial integrity
occasioned by the Bin Laden operation, it is not unassailable. By contrast, consent provides an
easy answer to the question of the legality of the American incursion into Yemen. A freestanding self-defense doctrine, independent of any territorial breach, also offers a justification for
both killings, although the availability of this defense as articulated remains open to debate given
the standard formulation of the doctrine.
3.1.1. Consent
Article 2(4) is not implicated where the territorial state consents to foreign intervention.80 There
is little indication that Pakistan was aware of the Bin Laden operation, let alone that it consented
to it. This lack of consent potentially distinguishes the Bin Laden operation from the so-called
“drone wars”81 in Waziristan and the other Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in
northwest Pakistan. These latter operations likely enjoy at least some tacit diplomatic
acquiescence, even though Pakistani officials occasionally publicly criticize them for domestic
political consumption.82 Consent to action in FATA would not necessarily extend to the Bin
Laden raid, however.83 All that said, we may never know for sure whether Pakistan had at some
time offered its open-ended consent to an operation of this kind notwithstanding the domestic
78
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unpalatability of such an authorization. In addition, it could be argued that Pakistan consented to
the operation ex post, thus forgoing any claims based on the territorial breach. 84 In any case, the
ensuing analysis assumes a lack of Pakistani consent at the time of the operation.
The viability of a consent defense to a breach of Article 2(4) is a major distinction between the
Bin Laden and al-Aulaqi attacks, the latter of which was implemented with Yemen’s consent
and, to a certain extent, assistance.85 The only potential impediment to this conclusion turns on
whether any offer of consent from the territorial state must be explicit and public to satisfy
Article 2(4). This position is not strongly supported in the law; even if good policy, it may also
be unreasonable.86 While Yemen can consent to another state entering its territory, however, it
cannot consent to that state violating IHL or human rights law while there. Thus, some lawful
justification for the use of deadly force must still be identified.
3.1.2. Self-Defense
The doctrine of self-defense appears in multiple incarnations in this analysis. The first is as a
U.N. Charter-based exception to Article 2(4)’s principle of sovereign inviolability. This
permutation of self-defense governs inter-state relations and has been employed to justify the
violation of Pakistani territory and Article 2(4) in light of the threat posed by Bin Laden and his
organization. A second form of the defense, not likely applicable under the facts as we know
them, derives from standard criminal law doctrine and operates to justify an individual’s use of
deadly force in a face-to-face confrontation with another individual posing a distinct threat to the
actor or to third parties.87 A third version is the most unsettled in the law. This variant operates as
a free-standing justification for a nation to employ deadly force against particular individuals
who pose a national threat, but not necessarily an immediate threat at the time they are targeted.
As articulated, this justification for deadly force exists even absent any territorial breach, state of
armed conflict, or imminent threat as required in the criminal law context and provides
continuous targeting authority with respect to individuals deemed dangerous to a particular
nation. The two relevant versions of the self-defense doctrine will be considered in turn.
3.1.2.1.

Self-Defense as a Defense to the Article 2(4) Breach

Absent Pakistan’s consent, the Bin Laden raid resulted in a prima facie breach of that country’s
sovereignty within the meaning of Article 2(4) of the Charter. The primary argument advanced
to justify this use of force is that the U.S. was exercising its inherent right—and sovereign
duty—of self-defense,88 a codified exception to the general prohibition on the use of force in the
U.N. Charter.89 The Charter-based theory of self-defense is that since at least September 11, if
not earlier, the U.S. has been subjected to a continuous armed attack and an ongoing risk of
further attacks from al Qaida, with Bin Laden at the helm. This risk of future attacks is cited to
84
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justify the incursion into Pakistani territory. Notwithstanding this apparent Charter-based
justification, a number of legal and factual hurdles exist to a smooth application of established
self-defense doctrine in these circumstances.
For one, Article 51 by its terms is triggered by the commission of an “armed attack.” Although
the precise definition of “armed attack” remains the subject of dispute,90 there was virtual
international unanimity that the attacks of September 11th satisfied any necessary gravity
threshold (from the perspective of scale and effect) to constitute such an attack. There is no
precise formula for evaluating the temporal relationship and the degree of immediacy between
the armed attack and the defensive response. At the moment, however, these tragic events might
be deemed too long-passed to provide the predicate legal foundation for the operation under
consideration absent some theory of extended or open-ended self-defense.91
It may be possible to accumulate effectuated and attempted attacks (starting with the embassy
bombings through the failed Christmas bombing) against the U.S. both prior and subsequent to
September 11th to justify a sustained invocation of self-defense. According to this so-called
pinprick theory, such a chain of events indicates a strong likelihood of future attacks and gives
rise to a potentially indefinite, but certainly protracted, right to engage in defensive action,92 even
when no particular attack is in progress that would, on its own, support a right to respond.93 A
state might then maintain a defensive response for some time in order to neutralize the ongoing
threat. While it is possible to identify multiple armed attacks against the U.S. emanating from al
Qaida proper, it is harder to do so with respect to AQAP if that is the relevant entity for
analyzing the Al-Aulaqi operation. Although certain attempted attacks have been publicly
attributed to AQAP, it remains uncertain whether any one act, or the acts taken together, has
reached the necessary intensity to constitute an “armed attack” against the U.S. within the
meaning of Article 51.
It is widely held that, notwithstanding the textual formulation of Article 51, international law
continues to recognize some notion of anticipatory (as opposed to reactive) self-defense, such
that a state need not await the launching of an attack in order to respond defensively.94
Historically, as articulated in the exchange of notes generated in connection with the 1837
Caroline incident, any notion of preemptive self-defense required proof that the attack be
90
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imminent, such that the defensive imperative is “instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice of
means and no moment for deliberation.”95 By this formulation, a state enjoys no privilege to act
in the face of mere threats, remote risks, or inchoate dangers.96
This high barrier to action remains controversial and would render unlawful many efforts at
anticipatory self-defense. The so-called Bush Doctrine, embodied in the President’s 2002
National Security Strategy, endeavored to augment the right of anticipatory self-defense by
relaxing the immediacy standard to allow for preventative attacks where there is a serious threat
to American security but no concrete attack in progress.97 Although compelling and influential,98
it is doubtful whether this approach has been fully accepted by other members of the
international community99 such that it can be said with confidence that a new customary norm
has developed.100 Nonetheless, a self-defense rationale for the use of force in Pakistan requires
the acceptance of some notion of anticipatory—indeed preventative—self-defense. This is
because there is no suggestion that the U.S. was aware of any impending attacks being
orchestrated by Bin Laden, although intelligence gleaned from seized materials suggests that
future attacks were indeed contemplated.101
The risk of relaxing the immediacy requirement is that the self-defense exception could be
invoked to mask unlawful aggressive acts or punitive measures taken in reprisal or retaliation.
Although there are sources of international law that categorically prohibit reprisals,102 military
operations such as Operation Infinite Reach launched in response to the 1998 embassy bombings
may suggest enduring support, and a continuing utility, for such a concept.103 This is especially
compelling given the difficulty of distinguishing between self-help actions taken in reprisal and
those taken in genuine self-defense.
Another challenge to positioning the raid within the archetypical self-defense framework is that,
by some accounts, the right of self-defense applies only in response to an armed attack by
another sovereign entity, even though no such limitation appears in Article 51 itself. The
International Court of Justice has adopted this position, even following the attacks of September
11th.104 By this rationale, measures in self-defense may only be exercised against the state legally
responsible for the initial attack. Because Pakistan did not engage in an armed attack against the
95
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U.S., and no one is arguing that Bin Laden’s actions may be attributed to that country, Article 51
would thus be inapplicable to justify the United States’ use of force on Pakistani territory. There
are indications, however, that the classically statist interpretation of Article 51 has given way to a
more expansive and realistic view in light of the increasing threat posed by non-state actors in
international relations.105 Both the Security Council106 and the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance
(NATO)107 invoked the right of self-defense following the attacks of September 11th, recognizing
a more fulsome range of potential sovereign threats. This suggests that the Court’s majority
approach fails to fully correspond with state practice.108 This may also signal either the
emergence of a new custom109 or the survival or revival of pre-Charter customary law.110
At a minimum, the right to use force in self-defense against non-state actors may extend to
situations in which the target state is advertently or even inadvertently harboring militants,111
given that the due diligence principle obliges states to prevent their territory from being used to
the detriment of other states.112 This obligation—which finds affinity in doctrines of neutrality
originating in the law of armed conflict113—exists even when the acts of such non-state actors
cannot be formally attributed to the territorial state under the Nicaragua effective control
threshold114 or other tests of state responsibility.115 As former Secretary of State George Shultz
argued, this position is based on the proposition that international law does not prohibit a state
from “attacking [terrorists] on the soil of other nations … or from using force against States that
support, train, and harbor terrorists or guerrillas.”116 Similar operations in the past, however,
have provoked condemnation as violations of the territorial state’s sovereignty. For example, in
1988, the Security Council considered Israel’s “assassination” in Tunisia of an alleged Palestine
Liberation Organization leader, Khalil El Wazir, to be an act of aggression117—one of the few
instances in which the Council employed that term to describe the unlawful use of force by a
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state.118 Likewise, states objected to Operation Phoenix, launched by Colombia into Ecuador to
pursue Raul Reyes and other Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia guerrillas, although
ultimately Colombia was not sanctioned in any meaningful way for its actions.119 In a post-9/11
world, however, the international community (or at least powerful states) may evince greater
tolerance for states taking defensive action within the territories of other states that are unwilling
or unable to repress irregular fighters in their midst, even if the territorial state could not be held
legally responsible for the acts of those militants. The theory is that such states forfeit their right
to noninterference when they fail to deal with such transnational security threats.120
The case at bar presents some special considerations because the government of Pakistan has
been under a continuing Security Council-imposed duty121 since before September 11th to refrain
from, and ensure that its nationals refrain from, harboring or assisting in any way Bin Laden and
those who associate with him.122 The most robust obligations in this regard are contained in
Resolution 1373, which obliged all states to “deny safe haven to those who finance, plan,
support, or commit terrorist acts” and “prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit
terrorist acts from using their respective territories for those purposes against other states or their
citizens.”123 Indeed, one wonders how Bin Laden’s whereabouts in a fortified compound in the
vicinity of an elite military academy for the past five years could possibly have been unknown to
the Pakistani government.124 This suggests that elements of the Pakistani government are
incompetent, implicated, or woefully ignorant about events in their own territory. Regardless of
which portrait is accurate, Pakistan’s unwillingness or inability to act against Bin Laden offers a
partial justification for the United States’ resort to defensive self-help in its territory.125
By some accounts, if the territorial state is making a good faith effort to address the presence of
armed groups in its midst, there is no right to use force in self-defense.126 Others argue that the
right to intervene with force exists only so long as some level of prior notice to, and consultation
118
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with, the implicated territorial state is undertaken absent evidence of collusion.127 According to
Abe Sofaer, a former State Department Legal Adviser:
While the U.S. regards attacks on terrorists being protected in the sovereign
territory of other States as potentially justifiable when undertaken in self-defense,
a State’s ability to establish the legality of such an action depends on its
willingness openly to accept responsibility for the attack, to explain the basis for
its action, and to demonstrate that reasonable efforts were made prior to the attack
to convince the State whose territorial sovereignty was violated to prevent the
offender’s unlawful activities from occurring.128
In addition, assuming it applies in one of the forms discussed above, the inherent right of
sovereign self-defense is limited as a matter of customary international law by the twin principles
of necessity and proportionality.129 These principles place a check on each use of force after the
outbreak of armed violence.130 The principle of necessity mandates that any response in selfdefense be strictly and objectively essential to protect core interests of the defending state and be
a last resort after more peaceful means (such as diplomacy) are exhausted or deemed futile.131
Proportionality in the jus ad bellum requires that any response to an armed attack be calibrated to
repel the original attack and prevent future attacks.132 Although no strict one-to-one force ratio is
required, the operation as a whole should be proportionate to the original transgression in terms
of scale of the response, the targets chosen, type and degree of force employed, and the results to
be achieved.133 The principle of proportionality might thus bar a state from widening the scope of
the conflict, for example to new territories.134 To the extent that non-state actors are the source of
the threat, any right to engage in acts in self-defense would normally be confined to terrorist
targets as contrasted to the infrastructure or installations of the territorial state,135 except
potentially in situations in which there is a high degree of symbiosis between the group and the
host state.136
As a final constraint on invoking self-defense, Article 51 contains several procedural
requirements, namely notification to the Security Council. These were adhered to in the
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immediate aftermath of 9/11, although not since.137 These requirements are not generally deemed
an absolute precondition for invoking the defense, although they are relevant to evaluating the
authenticity of a state’s claim of self-defense.138
Any requirement to cooperate with the host state was clearly not satisfied in the Bin Laden
killing.139 Accounts indicate that although the U.S. contemplated involving Pakistani authorities
in the operation, it ultimately resolved to act unilaterally.140 It is clear, however, that little to no
harm was done to Pakistani territory, which speaks to proportionality of response. In both cases,
targeting a particular individual is a smaller-scale response than might be tolerated in light of the
risks posed to the U.S. by al Qaida writ large and even by AQAP. In terms of necessity,
decapitating a non-state group may result in its dissolution, disbanding, or considerable
weakening, especially when the group is dominated by a messianic figure such as Bin Laden or
al-Aulaqi.141 Indeed, the Bin Laden plan was surgical by design to avoid confrontation with
Pakistani authorities and damage to public infrastructure.142 That said, the U.S. government has
admitted that there were contingency plans in place in the event that the team was confronted by
Pakistani military or police forces and had to fight their way out of the country. 143 Nonetheless,
because there was no clear predicate armed attack and no imminent threat in the scenarios under
consideration, neither operation fully complies with standard self-defense doctrine.
3.1.2.2.

A Free-Standing Right of Self-Defense

The doctrine of self-defense has historically applied to national decisions to deploy military
might on a macro scale against a threat to the nation. In the two scenarios under review, the unit
of analysis is much smaller—the target is a single dangerous individual rather than a foreign
regime or even a military asset or installation. This micro-level self-defense rationale does not
seek to justify a violation of Article 2(4) by virtue of the use of force by a state in another
sovereign’s territory. Nor does it seek to justify individual action (i.e., by any one SEAL
member) in the face of an imminent personal threat. Rather, the second relevant self-defense
rationale is more in the nature of a hybrid of the classic jus ad bellum and criminal law versions
of self-defense.144 It also finds affinity in status-based targeting doctrines contained in IHL,
although it is applied in situations outside of armed conflict when IHL is silent.
Presumably, this rationale is still bottomed on Article 51, which articulates a right to engage in
defensive action absent any actual or anticipated breach of Article 2(4). If so, however, the
textual necessity of a predicate armed attack and the debate over anticipatory self-defense remain
paramount. All told, it is difficult to rely upon Article 51 for a continuous targeting authority
137
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against individuals posing a more diffuse threat to the nation. If the Article 51-based
requirements for self-defense cannot be met, this rationale must find expression in customary
international law that either pre-dates or coexists alongside the U.N. Charter. The most
applicable state practice may be the Israeli action in Tunisia, which was not well-received
internationally.145 That said, the Tunisia episode was pre-9/11 and did not involve an individual
of Bin Laden’s infamy, so a blanket rule may no longer be valid.
Assuming such a continuous targeting authority exists, necessity remains to be established: that
each man posed a sufficient enough threat to justify the use of lethal force and that there were no
other operational means to suppress this threat. Certainly, if Bin Laden still had operational or
financial control over al Qaida activities, his killing would eliminate a serious and continuing
threat to the U.S., but that does not fully answer the question of necessity. The targetability of alAulaqi under such a self-defense rationale may be more contestable. This is where it becomes
important to establish his actions and role beyond the vituperative propaganda that is available in
the public record, unless such calls to jihad constitute a sufficient threat to the U.S.—a
proposition that is difficult to endorse in light of the United States’ constitutional devotion to free
speech principles. However, the U.S. has never had to fully establish al-Aulaqi’s role in AQAP
or provide solid evidence of his conduct beyond his ideological rants. In either case, invoking a
self-defense rationale for the killing of a single individual is very far from the original paradigm,
which is addressed to neutralizing a more macro sovereign threat. Indeed, it operates more like a
conflation of jus ad bellum self-defense concepts with jus in bello targeting rules.
3.1.3. A State of Necessity
A final argument that might have been invoked to preclude any wrongfulness of the United
States’ conduct is the existence of a general state of necessity not presenting a case of selfdefense stricto sensu.146 The freeform principle of necessity finds expression in Article 25 of the
International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts; it also finds resonance in general principles of criminal law.147 The Articles state
that necessity may not be invoked unless the otherwise unlawful act:
(a) is the only means for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave
and imminent peril; and
(b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards
which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole.148
This defense cannot, however, be invoked to justify or excuse the impairment of an essential
interest of another state or to breach a peremptory rule of international law,149 such as Article
2(4) of the Charter,150 limitations on the use of deadly force in IHL, or human rights law.151
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In his discussion of the circumstances negating the wrongfulness of a state’s conduct, Roberto
Ago as the ILC’s Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility opined that a state of necessity
might, as a standalone imperative, preclude the wrongfulness of limited (in terms of duration and
the means employed) sorties into sovereign territory falling short of acts of aggression. Ago
specifically mentions the example of “incursions into foreign territory to forestall harmful
operations by an armed groups which was preparing to attack the territory of the State.”152 The
ICJ has made clear, however, that although such a defense may exist in customary international
law, it is circumscribed such that it may only be invoked on an “exceptional basis” and under
“strictly confined conditions.”153 In particular, the impugned conduct must be responsive to an
imminent peril and be the sole means available to the responding state to safeguard an essential
interest against such a danger.154
The high threshold for invoking the defense as formulated by the ILC and the ICJ means that it is
difficult to apply to the incidents under consideration—which involve territorial intervention and
the application of deadly force—notwithstanding that Bin Laden and al-Aulaqi had eluded
capture in the past and that Pakistan and Yemen are undependable allies. A more micro
application of the doctrine of necessity may, however, be useful in tandem with the self-defense
doctrine to justify not informing Pakistan of the impending raid and other departures from the
strict requirements of standard self-defense doctrine.
3.2. Domestic Law Aspects of the Jus Ad Bellum
Although the two operations prompt an immediate consideration of the international jus ad
bellum, domestic law is implicated as well. The attack on Bin Laden had unequivocal
authorization under U.S. law in the form of the 2001 AUMF, which remains extant.155 The
AUMF, whose preamble invokes the right of self-defense,156 authorized the President to
use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001...157
In this way, the AUMF explicitly sanctions uses of force against the plotters of the attacks of
September 11th and was drafted with Bin Laden in mind. Indeed, the operation arguably
150
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accomplished exactly what Congress had in mind upon passage of the AUMF, albeit a decade
later. The only wrinkle concerns whether members of the CIA are covered by this legislation or
if some additional authority is required.
The AUMF provides a less stable foundation for military activities against groups and
individuals with more tenuous connections to 9/11,158 such as AQAP, which was not in existence
in 2001, or Tehrik-e-Taliban and the Haqqani Network in Pakistan, which only emerged later as
distinct threats to the U.S.159 Various pieces of legislation have been proposed to expand the
existing AUMF to authorize force against emerging hostile groups and terrorist suspects
globally.160 None of these efforts has yet borne fruit, and the Obama Administration has resisted
such Congressional re-authorization.161 Indeed, the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2012 expressly reaffirms the original scope of the AUMF.162
To date, few facts have emerged specifically linking al-Aulaqi to the attacks of September 11th,
although he apparently knew some of the plotters.163 As such, the AUMF provides an uncertain
foundation for operations in Yemen against individuals such as al-Aulaqi. That said, theories of
co-belligerency divorced from the law of neutrality164 have been advanced to bring groups such
as AQAP into the AUMF’s folds.165 Co-belligerency historically refers to a relationship among
states that are engaged cooperatively in an international armed conflict against another state or
other states. The theory is that an armed conflict between two parties automatically creates a
state of armed conflict with the opposing state(s)’ allies.166 Although a feature of past IACs, it is
not difficult to make the conceptual leap from states as co-belligerents to armed groups engaged
in NIACs as co-belligerents.167 As one U.S. district court noted, “‘co-belligerents’ as that term is
understood under the law of war” means “fully fledged belligerent fighting in association with
one or more belligerent powers” but does not include organizations that “merely share an
abstract philosophy or even a common purpose with al Qaeda—there must be an actual
association in the current conflict with al Qaeda or the Taliban.”168 In the litigation brought by
al-Aulaqi’s father, the Obama Administration argued that by virtue of making common cause
with al Qaida, AQAP “is a part of al-Qaeda—or at a minimum an organized, associated force or
co-belligerent of al-Qaeda in the non-international armed conflict between the U.S. and al-
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Qaeda.”169 Even a notion of NIAC co-belligerency, however, may not be enough to satisfy the
terms of the AUMF, which ultimately requires a link to 9/11.170
Some would argue that this discussion is moot. It is not settled whether domestic law is even
necessary to authorize discrete drone attacks like the al-Aulaqi operation. The Obama
Administration is on record stating that using drones in foreign countries does not require
congressional approval unless some threshold of force is reached and the lives of U.S. solders are
at risk. State Department Legal Adviser Harold Hongju Koh testified before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in connection with the Libya intervention that U.S. involvement, including
“limited strikes by Predator unmanned aerial vehicles against discrete targets,”171 would not
constitute participation in “hostilities” as understood by the War Powers Resolution, primarily
because such operations do not involve the deployment of U.S. armed forces into situations that
will expose them to exchanges of fire with hostile forces.172 With no need for domestic legal
authority, the al-Aulaqi operation would be evaluated under the international jus ad bellum only.
This position has been, however, hotly contested within and without the U.S. government.173
3.3. Conclusion: Jus Ad Bellum
Absent Pakistan’s consent, it is clear that Pakistan’s territorial integrity was violated in the Bin
Laden operation, although this infraction can be reasonably justified on expanded self-defense
grounds. Complaints about breaches of the jus ad bellum and Article 2(4) are for Pakistan to
raise against the U.S.174 Although Pakistan has grumbled about the violation of its sovereignty,
no formal claims have been pursued to date.175 Nor are they likely to be forthcoming given the
lack of actual damage to Pakistani property or interests 176 and the embarrassment factor
stemming from the fact that Bin Laden was living in relative comfort in Abbottabad for so long.
The al-Aulaqi operation does not run afoul of Article 2(4) in light of Yemen’s consent to U.S.
territorial engagement. That said, the employment of deadly force by a state even absent a
territorial breach still requires justification. For this, a more expanded form of self-defense is
required that hinges on a showing of the risk posed by the individual being targeted and his or
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her amenability to continuous targeting.177 All told, relying on self-defense to justify these
operations requires a number of controversial doctrinal leaps. These include: that a terrorist act
can constitute an “armed attack;” that in the face of multiple attacks, self-defense applies on a
continuous basis and not only in the immediate aftermath of any one attack; that self-defense can
be exercised in the territory of a state that is not acting in collusion with the menace; that selfdefense can be exercised against a single individual in keeping with the principle of necessity;
and—most importantly—that the law supports a form of anticipatory self-defense that can be
exercised in the absence of a concrete threat of future attack.
Even if these international law jus ad bellum arguments prove satisfactory, our inquiry cannot
end here. Domestic law governing the United States’ war powers also have a say. Although the
Bin Laden operation falls within the text and purpose of the AUMF, the domestic law foundation
for the al-Aulaqi killing remains uncertain if al-Aulaqi cannot reasonably be connected to the
September 11th attacks. In any case, it is difficult to imagine how any claims under domestic law
would be raised, given the historical reticence of courts to challenge executive decisions about
exercising the war powers.178 This is all assuming that domestic authorization is needed at all.
Yemen’s consent coupled with the argument that there is no need for domestic authorization for
discrete drone attacks means that the jus ad bellum may offer little resistance to the al-Aulaqi
operation.
If the jus ad bellum authorizes these operations, the jus in bello may further constrain the way in
which they were implemented. This depends on whether or not IHL applies to these events. If it
does, the U.S. government cannot exclusively rely on a jus ad bellum framework to justify both
killings to the exclusion of IHL. With this in mind, the next Section considers the jus in bello
implications of the two operations after considering the preliminary question of whether this
body of law applies at all. A subsequent Section discusses the human rights implications under
either a jus ad bellum or a jus in bello framework bearing in mind that Bin Laden and Al-Aulaqi,
no matter how odious, still enjoy the protection of human rights law.
4. Adherence to the Jus in Bello
The jus ad bellum and jus in bello are often conceived of as applying sequentially, with the latter
assuming greater salience once a party has resorted to armed force. 179 With the initiation of the
jus in bello, however, the jus ad bellum does not recede entirely, as certain aspects (such as the
principle of proportionality) continue to regulate the use of force once initiated. Moreover, not
every use of force triggers the applicability of the law of war; it is only when a use of force rises
to the level of an armed conflict, or has a sufficient nexus to an existing armed conflict, that
international humanitarian law (IHL) is implicated. Assuming IHL is applicable, however, the
jus in bello applies to all parties to the armed conflict pursuant to the equal application
principle,180 regardless of the outcome of any jus ad bellum analysis.181 The law insists on this
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acoustic separation for pragmatic as well as philosophical reasons.182 The point is to ensure the
application of the regulatory jus in bello no matter the cause or legality of the underlying conflict
so that both the aggressor and the aggressed—as well as the privileged and the unprivileged—are
bound by the same rules of conduct. The justness of one side’s cause thus does not modify the
application of the jus in bello between the parties. As such, the question of whether the U.S. was
entitled to use force vel non in Pakistan and Yemen does not resolve questions about whether
these particular applications of force were in compliance with the jus in bello.
It is natural to assume that IHL is the appropriate body of law to resolve questions of this nature,
given the use of combat power as well as ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and
elsewhere against elements of al Qaida. However, it is worth considering more closely the a
priori question of whether IHL applied in Abbottabad, Pakistan, and in Khashef, Yemen, which
are far from any active battlefield in Afghanistan and even from the border region between
Afghanistan and Pakistan where a spillover conflict is under way.183 If IHL is not applicable,
then the deaths of Bin Laden and al-Aulaqi could not be characterized as the kind of wartime
killing sanctioned as a normal—indeed expected—incident of war. The killings would then be
evaluated under other bodies of law to dramatically different conclusions, as discussed in the
next Section.
4.1. Is International Humanitarian Law The Operative Body of Law?
The law governing armed conflicts—IHL or the law of armed conflict—exhibits a Janus-like
character. On the one hand, IHL is protective toward certain classes of persons who are
considered hors de combat—detainees, surrendering combatants, civilians, the shipwrecked, the
sick, and the wounded. It is unlawful to deliberately target such individuals. At the same time,
IHL is permissive with respect to other classes of persons, namely active combatants and those
who engage in hostilities. In contrast to the immunities afforded to protected persons, this latter
class of persons may be lawfully targeted and killed. In situations in which it applies, IHL thus
tolerates—and indeed anticipates—many forms of violence that would be unlawful outside of the
context of war.184 In particular, IHL countenances the use of deadly force against the adversary
as a first resort as compared with peacetime law enforcement scenarios, in which the use of such
force is allowed only to respond to the exigencies of self-defense, the defense of others, and
halting a fleeing felon.185 In this way, IHL challenges default rules premised on the right to life,
such as the prohibitions against intentionally killing another human being
The triggering of IHL is no longer dependent on a declaration of war but rather turns
pragmatically on empirical facts on the ground, most saliently the presence of an armed conflict
or situation of occupation. It is widely accepted that an armed conflict is deemed to exist when
“there is resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between
181
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governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.”186
The triggering conditions of IHL differ depending on whether the conflict is an international
(IAC) or non-international armed conflict (NIAC).187 Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions indicates that those treaties apply in all cases of “declared war or any other armed
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties.” The law of
armed conflict thus would apply wherever the armed forces of at least two states are embattled.
Indeed, Pictet’s authoritative commentary suggests that those treaties become activated upon a
very low threshold of inter-state violence,188 although this view has been qualified in several
modern sources to effectively exclude border incidents and other small-scale military
confrontations between states.189 Indeed, the U.S. has argued that military responses undertaken
pursuant to the inherent right of self-defense as set forth in Article 51 of the Charter do not under
all circumstances rise to the level of an armed conflict.190
By contrast, a higher threshold exists for establishing the existence of a NIAC that is premised
on two factors: the scale or intensity of the violence191 and the degree of organization of the
parties.192 This higher threshold exists to distinguish such conflicts from a number of situations
that do not trigger IHL, even if such events provoke a military response by the state. These
include: small scale operations involving military assets that cannot be deemed to be part of a
larger armed conflict; situations of “internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and
sporadic acts of violence, and other acts of a similar nature;”193 and acts of “banditry,
unorganised and short-lived insurrections, or terrorist activities.”194
All NIACs are governed by Article 3, which is common to the four Geneva Conventions and
applies to all conflicts “occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.” 195 The
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International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) commentary offers several criteria for
triggering common Article 3 (CA3) that turn on whether the party in revolt manifests a sufficient
degree of organization and hierarchy, the legal government is obliged to have recourse to its
military forces, the dissident group has popular support, the dispute has been placed on a U.N.
agenda, and the insurgents exercise some level of control over territory. 196 The international
tribunals, in turn, have identified a number of additional factors relevant to evaluating whether
the intensity of the violence is sufficient to pass through the IHL gateway. These include: the
number and duration of individual confrontations, the types of weaponry and equipment
employed, the degree of physical destruction, the number of embattled individuals and
casualties, the geographical and temporal breadth of clashes, the number of civilians displaced or
otherwise impacted by fighting, and the involvement of the United Nations (particularly the
Security Council).197 This same case law employs criteria for identifying what constitutes an
organized armed group. These mirror the characteristics of a formal national army and include: a
hierarchical structure and rules of engagement, infrastructure to enlist and train recruits, the
ability to launch military operations, a central authority empowered to negotiate with
governmental representatives, and a leadership corps capable of being held responsible for the
group’s acts.198 It has been argued that in light of Article 3’s reference to the “territory” of a
High Contracting Party, CA3 is meant to govern classic civil wars and does not apply to
situations in which a state is engaged in an armed conflict with a non-state actor outside its own
borders and on the territory of another High Contracting Party.199 Most commentators agree,
however, that CA3 provides a floor of protection for all conflicts not of an international
character.200 Notwithstanding these treaty-based triggers for IHL, an emerging customary IHL
applies across the conflict spectrum and is less dependent on the increasingly artificial
classification dichotomy201 that frames the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols.202
Situations of terrorism and counterterrorism do not constitute “armed conflicts” until a certain
threshold of intensity, continuity,203 group organization,204 and military reciprocity is reached.205
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For example, the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission—an advisory body on constitutional
matters—determined in 2006 that
sporadic bombings and other violent acts which terrorist networks perpetrate in
different places around the globe and the ensuing counter-terrorism measures,
even if they are occasionally undertaken by military units, cannot be said to
amount to an ‘armed conflict’ in the sense that they trigger the applicability of
International Humanitarian Law.206
Some commentators have gone further and resisted the application of IHL to terrorist (and
criminal) organizations altogether, on the putative ground that to do so would give the members
of such groups the status and legitimacy of belligerents. 207 Instead, they have urged the adoption
of a pure law enforcement model for counterterrorism operations, acknowledging the occasional
necessity to deploy military might in this context.208
Notwithstanding the distinction often drawn between armed conflicts and acts of terrorism, the
international tribunals regularly consider acts that would be described as “terroristic” in
determining whether the required intensity of violence has been reached for the purpose of
applying IHL.209 Indeed, a blanket rejection of the application of IHL to terrorism fails to
acknowledge the evolution of modern threats to peace and security, the way in which classic
terrorist attacks can be strategically employed in armed conflict situations, the ease of access to
advanced and destructive weaponry by a slew of non-state actors, the reach and degree of
organization of modern terrorist groups, the necessity of resorting to military assets in
counterterrorism efforts, and the potency of ideology in the absence of territorial ambitions.
Moreover, conceding that a situation amounts to a NIAC that is governed by IHL does not
accord any legitimation or privilege to use force to non-state actors, be they rebels, insurgents,
paramilitaries, drug-traffickers, insurrectionists, pirates, or terrorists. Such fighters remain
unprivileged belligerents who enjoy neither combat immunity nor prisoner-of-war (POW) status
and who can be prosecuted domestically for their acts of violence.
Accepting that IHL does apply in principle to terrorist groups and to conflicts pitting sovereign
forces against such armed groups, the U.S. has been involved in an armed conflict with al Qaida
since at least September 11th and the ensuing invasion of Afghanistan on October 7, 2001.210
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Prior to this point, the U.S. had responded to acts of terrorism attributable to al Qaida (such as
the first World Trade Center attack in 1993211 or even the U.S.S. Cole attack in Yemen in
2000212) primarily within a law enforcement framework.213 Since September 2011, however, the
U.S. has assumed a war footing by enacting an authorization to use military force, deploying
troops abroad, and establishing military commissions. In so doing, it has eschewed, or at least
de-emphasized, the criminal law framework. In terms of the customary factors for finding the
existence of an armed conflict, the level of intensity of violence in Afghanistan and in certain
spillover regions obviously continues to exceed that necessary to signal the existence of an
armed conflict. It is clear that al Qaida manifests a sufficient degree of organization to launch
effective attacks against a range of military objectives and civilian objects. Although not
necessary to trigger IHL, al Qaida exercises some control over territory in parts of Afghanistan,
in pockets of the Af-Pak border region, and perhaps even in enclaves within the Arabian
Peninsula, although territorial dominion is not really its modus operandi. The Security Council
has described the situation as a threat to international peace and security214 and expanded its
counterterrorism agenda considerably in response, but—as is customary—it has never declared
the existence of an armed conflict per se.
As a matter of U.S. law, the conflict originating in Afghanistan has been deemed a NIAC to
which at least CA3 applies.215 In an IAC, military operations can—at a minimum—be carried out
throughout the sovereign territory of the parties at war.216 However, it is unclear how to apply
this concept to conflicts and to organized armed groups that are not confined to discrete territory.
Thus, the precise temporal span, geographic boundaries, and spatial reach of the NIAC with al
Qaida—and concomitantly of IHL—remains uncertain and variable.217 If the killings of Bin
Laden and al-Aulaqi are to be evaluated according to IHL, it is necessary to develop and defend
a theory that IHL, and especially its targeting rules, applies to these extra-battlefield events.218
This requires the extension of IHL to areas well beyond the territory where IHL’s predicate
requirements of intensity and organization have been met, far from those locations where a “hot”
conflict is being waged, and even beyond areas where terrorist attacks are being planned or
launched.
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Several theories exist for applying IHL to both events. Adopting a territorial perspective
reminiscent of the law governing IACs and the concept of neutrality, one can argue that IHL
extends to any territory where combat activities between warring parties are under way.219 Thus,
IHL will apply to spillover conflicts that do not respect sovereign boundaries such that “the
situation in the neighbouring country [is] immediately qualified as a non-international armed
conflict.”220 At the moment, the conflict against al Qaida proper has leaked through the porous
borders of Afghanistan and into the FATA regions of Pakistan, although it is unclear to what
extent the U.S. has troops on the ground there. How much farther IHL extends—to Abbottabad
(roughly 120 miles from the Afghan border), to the Arabian Peninsula, or even to the U.S.
itself—remains open to argumentation. In any case, from a territorial or combat activity
perspective, the contention that the armed conflict with al Qaida extended at a minimum to the
events in Abbottabad is defensible given the degree of cross-border hostilities already.
An alternative perspective premised on the identity of the parties would provide that so long as
IHL has been triggered, it can be deemed to regulate the relationship between adversaries
wherever they engage each other, regardless of the location of combat activities stricto sensu. By
this more expansive, and more controversial, account,221 IHL essentially follows the warring
parties wherever they go,222 and geographic borders are largely irrelevant to the application of
IHL rights and duties.223 The theater of war is thus non-static and potentially global when dealing
with violent groups that are motivated by ideology rather than territorial aspirations or political
ambitions and that spurn international borders. Out-of-theater attacks by and on members of an
opposition force are thus automatically subject to IHL, regardless of where the predicate conflict
is being waged geographically.224 This approach finds some indirect support in the Geneva
Conventions, which envisage the protective aspects of IHL extending anywhere that a protected
person is “in the hands of” a party to an IAC.225 So, in a NIAC, IHL may be deemed to apply any
time a state uses forcible measures against a non-state fighter, whether on the state’s own
territory or extraterritorially and regardless of the proximity to hostilities. Thus, IHL would apply
to any confrontation between U.S. forces and an al Qaida member, be it in the Near East or the
Eastern Seaboard. A consequence of this approach, however, is an increased threat to civilians
who are at risk of becoming “collateral damage” even when far from any battlefield.
In addition to needing a theory of IHL applicability writ large, it is also necessary to show that
any use of force has a nexus to the predicate armed conflict. Although hostilities within Pakistan
are part of the pre-existing conflict with al Qaida, it is more difficult to argue that events in the
219
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Arabian Peninsula are connected to this particular conflict given the identity of the parties.
Indeed, central to al-Aulaqi’s father’s lawsuit was that the U.S. was “not at war with Yemen, or
within it.”226 Satisfying the requirement that operations in Yemen have a nexus to the larger al
Qaida conflict would depend on the relationship between AQAP and al Qaida proper, an inquiry
central to satisfying the AUMF as well.227 In the alternative, it could be argued that IHL was
activated by a different, parallel NIAC being waged in Yemen. This conflict pits AQAP against
the government of Yemen,228 with the U.S. occasionally intervening on the side of Yemen, but
not a full party to the conflict.229 The United States’ actions would be governed by IHL under
these circumstances, although arguably the nexus requirement would dictate that only attacks
against unprivileged combatants waging war against Yemen (as opposed to against the U.S.)
would be governed by IHL targeting rules.
If the United States’ forcible measures in Yemen are not perforce part of the original conflict
with al Qaida or part of the internal conflict being waged by Yemen, then a separate IHL trigger
analysis is necessary in order to invoke IHL’s permissive targeting rules for the al-Aulaqi killing.
This would require the existence of an armed conflict between the U.S. and AQAP itself. In
terms of the two criteria developed by the ICTY for determining the existence of an armed
conflict—the existence of organized groups engaged in hostilities of a sufficient intensity—
AQAP is now probably sufficiently coherent to satisfy the first criterion.230 However,
notwithstanding that the U.S. has engaged in a number of drone strikes against terrorist targets in
Yemen since 2002, it is doubtful whether the required intensity of violence has been reached for
the hostilities between the U.S. and AQAP on their own to have passed through the IHL
gateway.231 If they have, of course, then there would be domestic law implications in light of the
War Powers Resolution.232
Assuming that IHL applies to these events because this body of law follows warring parties
wherever they engage each other with force, the legality of both operations can be established,
although it still remains necessary to make several crucial doctrinal leaps to do so. As discussed
in the next section, these leaps turn on the fact that the positive law governing NIACs does not
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fully recognize the concept of combatancy or continuous status-based targeting, which is central
to the principle of distinction in, and thus the targeting rules of, IHL.233
4.2. Bin Laden and Al-Aulaqi as Lawful Targets
Combatants engaged in an IAC are considered to be lawful military objectives; as such, they are
vulnerable to continuous targeting, notwithstanding their conduct or role at the time they are
engaged. There is no duty to endeavor to capture such individuals, unless they offer their
surrender. While these permissive rules clearly apply to uniformed members of a state’s armed
forces, they also apply to officials occupying political positions so long as such individuals play
a role within the military’s chain of command. Civilians, by contrast, enjoy immunity from direct
targeting unless and until they directly participate in hostilities. Individuals who offer indirect
assistance to hostilities—by way of financing, training, or inspiration—retain their immunity
from direct attack (although they may be prosecuted for their actions). In NIACs, according to
APII, members of non-state groups employing military force are civilians directly participating
in hostilities subject to conduct-based targeting rather than combatants subject to status-based
targeting. States that have engaged in NIACs contest this view. Although the ICRC has accepted
the notion that individuals may be targeted on the basis of their undertaking a continuous combat
function within an organized armed groups, there is no consensus on whether the notion of
combatancy and true status-based targeting exists in NIACs. Because neither Bin Laden nor alAulaqi were directly participating in hostilities at the time they were killed, this debate is central
to confirming the legality of both operations.
4.2.1. The Right to Target Enemy Combatants as Military Objectives
If we are satisfied that IHL applies to these operations at all, the legal analysis goes rather
smoothly—to a point.234 The principle of distinction—foundational to the law of war—dictates
that only military objectives may be the target of direct attack.235 Military objectives are defined,
“in so far as objects are concerned” as “those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or
use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction,
capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military
advantage.”236 Although enemy combatants are deemed military objectives under IHL, the text is
unclear as to whether such persons are targetable only if their “destruction, capture or
neutralization” offers “a definite military advantage.”237 The text implies otherwise by defining
only military “objects” with reference to these limitations. Even with such a limitation, it can be
argued that there is target engagement authority for all enemy combatants, because their
233
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elimination will inexorably offer a military advantage to the other side.238 Indeed, the sole
objective of hostilities is to “weaken the military forces of the enemy.”239
The principle of distinction also embodies an “inward-looking responsibility:”240 in exchange for
the privilege of engaging in hostilities, combatants must distinguish themselves from the civilian
population in order to signal their targetability.241 Combatants are targetable as such by virtue of
their status rather than their conduct.242 Vulnerability to status-based targeting follows them
wherever they go such that they may be attacked even when not directly engaged in hostilities.243
NIACs, by definition, involve the participation of non-state organized armed groups whose
members are not accorded the status of combatants per se.244 Violations of the principle of
distinction are often the hallmark of NIACs, in which rebels and insurrectionists strategically use
the civilian population for cover. In so doing, these fighters exploit the principle of distinction—
and the presumption that their opponents will respect it—to compensate for asymmetries in
military might. Because these armed groups act independently of any state, their members do not
have the right to participate in hostilities; nor do they enjoy the privileges and immunities that
are accorded to members of a state’s armed forces, such as POW status or combat immunity. 245
As such, every act of violence committed by members of such militia in the context of an armed
conflict is unlawful under the operative domestic law. Participating in an armed conflict without
the privilege of doing so, however, does not violate humanitarian law per se unless particular
acts rise to the level of a punishable war crime.246
4.2.2. No Express Duty to Capture Combatants
As a matter of established IHL doctrine, there is no express duty to capture privileged
combatants in IACs in lieu of killing them247 in the absence of an unambiguous offer of
unconditional surrender.248 Assuming no risk to civilians or civilian objects, the standard
doctrine dictates that the right to kill combatants is only limited by rules prohibiting perfidy and
proscribing the use of means and methods that cause maux superflus—“unnecessary suffering
and superfluous injury.”249 The ability to make combatants the object of attack terminates once a
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combatant is hors de combat through illness, injury, surrender, capture, or other
incapacitation.250
This categorical principle—that combatants may be targeted at any time regardless of their
conduct—developed when troops confronted each other primarily on formal battlefields, far
from civilian society. Arguably, it applies in full force to the soldier taking his family to the
cinema, subject to the proportionality and precautionary principles. While doctrinally and
operationally valid, this principle has rarely been fully tested in such non-theater-of-war contexts
and is not without controversy. The weak form of the critique would countenance the killing of
combatants only if there is no reasonable chance of apprehension,251 with some allowance
provided for considerations of force protection.252 Thus, this continuous targeting authority may
be lessened by the principle of military necessity where targets pose no threat to opposing forces
or where any potential threat can be neutralized through lesser means.253 The strong form of this
revisionism rejects the premise of the “dispensability” of combatants altogether and would
require the resort to non-lethal force whenever the military objective can be still be
accomplished, even if military effectiveness, efficiency, or force protection may be
compromised.254 Neither of these critiques, however, finds full expression in standard doctrine.
All that said, there may be tactical, strategic, pragmatic, and moral reasons—including the
imperatives of intelligence gathering, public relations, and mercy—for offering to accept the
surrender of, or capturing, someone posing a threat rather than killing the person outright.
Although there may be no duty to capture fighters in lieu of killing them, especially in a theater
of war, the right to kill the adversary is limited by the duty to accept surrender if genuinely
offered.255 Since ancient times,256 it has been unlawful to declare ex ante that no quarter shall be
given,257 which includes the issuance of orders to not accept surrender.258 Individuals who offer
to surrender are deemed hors de combat and enjoy immunity from direct attack. As a general
proposition, however, combatants need not be given an opportunity to surrender before they may
be engaged. Moreover, a fighting force need not immediately take surrendering fighters into
custody if it is not safe to do so; however, such individuals may no longer be the object of attack
unless they resume hostilities.259
4.2.3. Targeting Heads of State, Commanders-in-Chief, and Political Leaders
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Military officers, as well as the rank and file, operating on a battlefield within a chain of
command are clear military objectives under IHL. By contrast, a blanket authorization to kill
political leaders in their capitals, even in a time of armed conflict, may give pause.260 Indeed,
some early international law commentators expressed concern about targeting a sovereign leader
outside the field of battle.261 Many modern commentators still assume that IHL prohibits such
acts of assassination. For support, they cite Article 23(b) of the 1907 Hague Regulations, which
proscribes “assassination, proscription, or outlawry of an enemy, or putting a price upon an
enemy’s head, as well as offering a reward for an enemy ‘dead or alive.’”262 This prohibition,
however, is now-a-days interpreted to address acts of treachery or perfidy,263 and modern IHL
contains no specific rules264 governing the targetability of heads of state or other political
individuals per se.265
Evaluating the legality of attacks on political, rather than military, leaders thus proceeds
according to default IHL targeting principles. What ultimately matters is the combat role played
by the political leader and the manner and circumstances of the operation. A logical application
of the military objective construct suggests that lawful targets would include any political leader
(including a Minister of Defense or head of state) within a chain of command who ultimately
designs or directs military operations as well as the civilian commander-in-chief of a national
army.266 Nonetheless, the rhetoric surrounding scenarios in which the targeting of heads of state
is contemplated suggests lingering discomfort with this conclusion.267 As a result, post hoc attack
justifications often focus on the less troubling objective of targeting an army’s command and
control apparatus, which is often difficult to separate from the leader him- or herself. In light of
the principle of distinction, IHL offers little to justify the killing of political leaders whose roles
are purely civilian (e.g., a Minister of Education) or who are mere figureheads.
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4.2.4. Targeting Civilians
Although the principle of distinction provides that civilians normally enjoy full immunity from
direct attack, the Protocols provide that civilians can be targeted when and for such time as they
take a direct part in hostilities (DPH).268 These provisions are premised on the idea that civilians
lose their immunity from attack when they behave like combatants. The DPH doctrine applies in
both IACs and NIACs.269 That said, in today’s armed conflicts, it is most salient in the NIAC
context in which armed non-state actors are not considered “combatants” even when they do
battle with governmental authorities or each other. The Protocols thus consider militants linked
to non-state groups to be civilians who are targetable only when directly participating in
hostilities.270
The ICRC Interpretive Guidance has set forth a three-part test for determining when an
individual can be considered to be directly participating in hostilities.271 This includes
consideration of the threshold of harm posed by his or her actions, the causal link between his or
her actions and potential harm to the opponent, and a nexus to hostilities.272 Under this
framework, it is not enough to contribute to the war-fighting capabilities of an armed group;
rather, the potential target must be in a position to bring about the harm in question in “one
causal step.”273 In this way, the DPH construct offers a conduct-based, rather than status-based,
targeting doctrine.
Persons posing an immediate danger, such as an insurrectionist sniper or someone laying an
improvised explosive device (IED), or persons providing direct assistance to such endeavors,
easily satisfy the three-step DPH test.274 The ICRC also accepts that direct participation in
hostilities includes more than involvement in the physical attack itself; rather, a penumbra of
preparatory and concluding activities may also qualify so long as the proximate causality
criterion is met. By contrast, the test would tend to exclude from targetability persons planning a
belligerent act, recruiting others to participate in such an act, financing violence, formulating
ideology, or engaging in strategic decision-making about hostile activities.275 That said, most
thinking in this area has been in the nature of the hypothetical, so there is little positive law to
draw on.
One jurisprudential source is the Israeli Supreme Court’s opinion in the so-called Targeted
Killing opinion. Here, the Court was asked to consider the Israeli policy in the context of an
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occupation and IAC and in the absence of concrete facts.276 Rather than reaching a blanket
conclusion, the Court mandated a case-by-case approach.277 Nonetheless, it signaled that it
would find that “a person who aids the unlawful combatants by general strategic analysis, and
grants them logistical, general support, including monetary aid” is taking only an indirect part in
hostilities.278 Likewise, an individual engaged in creating or distributing propaganda would not
be targetable under this view.279 The Court considers the person sending others to be taking a
direct part in hostilities or otherwise planning operations, however, to be lawfully subject to
direct attack.280 This latter conclusion is contestable as it reads “direct” more broadly than would
the ICRC, which considers the generalized recruitment and training of fighters to be “indirect”
participation because of a lack of an immediate causal link between the conduct and harm to the
enemy.281 According to the ICRC, in cases of doubt, the potential target must be presumed to be
a civilian who is immune from direct attack.282 The Israeli Supreme Court, by contrast, seems to
flip this presumption in order to encourage civilians to avoid hostilities in order to protect
them.283
The treaty language governing the DPH doctrine suggests that civilians are targetable only “for
such time as” they are directly participating in hostilities.284 This implies that the concept
governs targeting decisions by state actors based on observing the commission of hostile acts in
flagrante rather than on exterior manifestations of combatant status, such as a uniform or fixed
distinctive sign. Armed forces are expected to internalize and employ the test to respond to
targets of opportunity on the basis of incomplete information in an operational environment. The
DPH doctrine also provides a criminal defense in the context of a prosecution for the unlawful
killing of a civilian.285 In light of its complexity, the multi-factor DPH test is perhaps more
amenable to such an ex post application than to ex ante targeting decisions that may require
virtually instantaneous decision-making. This temporal limitation also raises the specter of a
revolving door, whereby individuals regain civilian status—which accords protection against
direct attack—every time they suspend their participation in hostilities. As a result of this textual
limitation, unprivileged combatants in NIACs are able to evade direct attack more easily than are
privileged combatants in IACs.286
To respond to the operational realities of NIACs and pressure from states seeking greater
targeting authority vis-à-vis the members of organized armed groups engaged in NIACs, the
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ICRC proposed the “continuous combat function” concept, which envisions a notion of quasicombatancy in NIACs287 and a concomitant function-based (rather than merely conduct-based)
targeting doctrine.288 As the theory goes, when an individual’s participation in hostilities is not
“spontaneous, sporadic, or unorganized” but rather continuous, he or she may be deemed to be a
member of an organized armed group belonging to a party to the conflict. 289 Individuals who
take up such a continuous combat function within an organized armed group lose their civilian
status “for so long as they assume their continuous combat function.”290 As such, so long as such
individuals carry out a combat function, they may be targeted at any time, even when not directly
participating in hostilities.291 It is only once individuals disengage from the group or cease to
perform a continuous combat function—however defined—that they regain their civilian status
and their immunity from direct attack (but not from prosecution for war crimes or their acts of
belligerency that violate domestic law).292
This concept hinges on what constitutes a “combat function.” Logically, this could apply to those
individuals who do not participate directly in tactical combat activities in the sense of regularly
discharging weapons. Thus, it would encompass individuals who organize, equip, provide
intelligence for, or otherwise direct the hostile activities of subordinates and collaborators on a
continuous basis.293 From this point, it may be difficult to draw the line to exclude those who, on
a continuous basis, inspire and fund hostile activities in a collective operation; these activities,
however, are not uniformly accepted as “combat functions.”294 In any case, within the continuous
combat function framework, it is crucial to develop reliable, objectively verifiable, and current
intelligence of a potential target’s conduct and role because that individual will be targetable at
any time or place by virtue of his or her function rather than contemporaneous conduct.295 The
strength of this evidence will be debated ex ante when target lists are drawn up; it may also be
tested—in accordance with penal burdens of proof—in the event of a criminal prosecution for
potential breaches of the principle of distinction.
The ICRC has also proposed additional restraints on the right of a state to target unprivileged
combatants who are directly participating in hostilities, or who assume a continuous combat
function in an organized armed group, that derive from the principles of military necessity and
humanity.296 These principles prohibit “the infliction of suffering, injury or destruction not
actually necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate military purposes.”297 The ICRC notes
that in certain circumstances—especially in NIACs in which the national force exercises plenary
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or at least partial control over territory—these limitations may require the capture of, or the
offering of surrender to, a civilian directly participating in hostilities, rather than his or her
outright killing.298 In this way, the ICRC would accord civilians who are directly participating or
assuming a continuous combat function in hostilities a measure of protection that is not accorded
to privileged combatants in an IAC. This position finds resonance in the Israeli decision, which
held that a civilian taking a direct part in hostilities “cannot be attacked at such time as he is
doing so, if a less harmful means can be employed.”299 The Court traced this sequential leastinjurious-means approach to a general principle of proportionality found in Israeli domestic law
(and perhaps also to the state of occupation), rather than to IHL stricto sensu.300
The ICRC’s guidance has not been universally accepted. In particular, the ICRC has been
criticized by some governments and academics for aligning members of organized armed forces
closer to civilians than to regular state armed forces and for unreasonably circumscribing the
targetability of those who join organized armed groups.301 In particular, the continuous combat
function construct disallows the direct targeting of individuals who undertake many non-combat
support functions that are regularly performed by uniformed service members and that are
integral to a fighting force, but that are not combat functions per se.302 The counter-argument is
that civilians who join an organized armed group unaffiliated with a state should be equally as
targetable as privileged combatants engaged in an IAC, regardless of their assumption of a
combat versus support function. Indeed, there is state practice in NIACs asserting a continuous
targeting authority that does not hinge upon a showing that the individual was participating in
hostilities or even engaged in a continuous combat function but rather that the target was a
member of an organized armed group that is engaged in hostilities.303 In addition, the continuous
combat function concept unrealistically assumes that militants occupy a permanent functional
role in any fighting force, which may not be the case with non-state groups whose members may
occupy roles that are more fluid than in a national army.304 There is also objection to the
purported obligation to employ least injurious means in NIACs on the ground that militants
should be targetable regardless of whether capture is possible, as is the rule in IACs. This latter
criticism hinges in part on the fact that it is difficult to come up with defensible reasons to limit
the proposed sequential approach to NIACs and to unprivileged belligerents.305 Such limitations,
whether applicable in NIACs or IACs, would constrain the use of lethal force in ways that the
dissenters are unwilling to countenance. These perceived problems with the ICRC’s guidance
gave rise to intense controversy and caused several of the experts involved to recuse themselves
from mention in the final report.306
4.2.5. The Events in Question
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Turning to the events at issue, al Qaida has manifested an enduring intention to engage in
hostilities against the U.S. and other states. Determining the targetability of particular members
of al Qaida within the IHL targeting schema and the ICRC’s DPH guidance nonetheless raises a
number of ambiguities. Al Qaida has been characterized as a loosely-organized and
internationally-dispersed organization whose subunits share an overarching ideology, but enjoy a
high degree of autonomy in terms of tactics and objectives.307 Perhaps by design, individual units
may not meet the criteria employed in IHL for an organized armed group, which assume such
groups are objectively identifiable and sufficiently organized to launch military operations of a
particular intensity and duration. It is unclear to what extent al Qaida cells operating outside of
Afghanistan take orders from any central authority in the sense of their being a “terrorism
franchise.”308
Not surprising, the U.S. took the position that both individuals were military objectives, equated
to enemy commanders in the field. In statements following their deaths, U.S. spokespersons
stressed the two men’s continuing or growing (in the case of al-Aulaqi) operational roles.309 If al
Qaida satisfies the organized armed group criterion, Bin Laden—separate and apart from his
command and control apparatus—as the head of an organized armed group involved in the
conflict can be conceptualized as a lawful military objective. Of course, it is fair to query
whether he still exercised any operational leadership at the time he was killed. In the alternative,
his role may have become purely symbolic or ceremonial, especially given the apparent
decentralization and compartmentalization of al Qaida and Bin Laden’s relative isolation in
Pakistan.310 Likewise, al-Aulaqi has been described as a propagandist and media personality
rather than a tactician. An argument could thus be made that both Bin Laden and al-Aulaqi were
akin to political leaders, rather than military personnel, which would place them in the grey area
surrounding the right to target civilian leaders. This may be a distinction without a difference
when it comes to terrorist groups. Although “many of the world’s most sophisticated non-state
warring parties have distinct political and military wings,”311 in terrorist groups, there may be
little division between the political and military leadership.312
None of the reports of the incidents reveals evidence that either individual was directly
participating in hostilities at the time he was killed, hence the importance of the continuing
combat function concept for legalizing both attacks. That concept provides cover, however, only
if both men in fact occupied combat roles on a continuous basis, which might be more difficult to
prove if the two men were ideologues or financiers. These distinctions lose their force if
continuous targeting authority exists vis-à-vis members of organized armed groups in NIACs on
the basis of mere membership alone, as contended by many states. By this approach, both men
were fully assimilated to combatants engaged in an IAC for targeting purposes who could be
engaged at any time based on their status rather than their conduct or functional role without
running afoul of the principle of distinction.
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In terms of the United States’ adherence to IHL proportionality in Operation Neptune Spear,
collateral damage was minimal, especially when assessed against the high value of the target.313
The raid resulted in the death or injury of two colorable civilians (excluding the courier and Bin
Laden’s son). This is an impressive result in light of the fact that upwards of thirty people,
including potentially thirteen children, were thought to have been present or residing in the
compound.314 Apparently, there was some dissension among President Obama’s inner national
security circle about how to respond to the intelligence of Bin Laden’s whereabouts. It has been
reported that President Obama ultimately “vetoed a plan to obliterate the compound with an
airstrike.”315 One concern with this plan was that Bin Laden’s presence in the compound may
have been impossible to verify. Given Bin Laden’s residence in a civilian neighborhood, the risk
of collateral damage would also no doubt have been higher with an air strike than a ground raid.
That said, IHL tolerates a higher degree of collateral damage with high value targets.
Because accomplished face-to-face, the Bin Laden operation does not raise many of the concerns
inherent to the use of RPVs as in the al-Aulaqi operation.316 The use of drones in modern warfare
has raised discomfort on a number of grounds, including the lack of reciprocity of risk, the
concern that their use stems from an excessive preoccupation with force protection, 317 the
inability to precisely calibrate the level of force employed, and the fact that their use precludes
the ability to capture suspects or to accept their surrender318 (which, of course, is true of all aerial
attacks).319 From a jus in bello perspective, there is nothing about using continuous surveillance
and precision-guided missiles per se that runs afoul of the principle of proportionality so long as
the object of the attack is a lawful one and precautions against incidental harm are implemented.
Indeed, we might ultimately prefer a decapitation strike in which key individuals are targeted
with precision, after detailed pattern-of-life analyses, rather than eliminated in large-scale clashes
between armed forces or following airstrikes using heavier munitions.320 In terms of collateral
damage, there appears to have been no prior knowledge that Samir Khan, the other American
citizen killed, was in the vehicle with al-Aulaqi that day.321 Without an expressly operational
role, it is unclear if Khan himself would have been considered a military objective. According to
reports, he too played a central role in al Qaida’s propaganda machine, but whether such
machinery is a military objective remains controversial.322 We have little insight into the
identities of the other individuals in the car that day, although one of the dead may have been
Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri, an alleged bomb maker.323
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Even if Bin Laden is a legitimate military objective, his death could still constitute a war crime if
he was hors de combat (i.e., if he was surrendering, sick, or injured so as to pose no further
threat) or killed treacherously or perfidiously (i.e., if he could have reasonably thought the
SEALs were civilians). Accounts do not bear these scenarios out,324 but we may never know for
sure whether a genuine surrender was offered. Even if the attack was lawfully executed by the
immediate actors, a war crime could have been committed by their superiors in the event that an
order to take no prisoners was issued. The Administration insists, however, that contingency
plans were in place for the team to accept Bin Laden’s surrender if it was offered, implying that
there was no order to take no quarter. A spokesperson stated:
The team had the authority to kill Osama bin Laden unless he offered to
surrender; in which case the team was required to accept his surrender if the team
could do so safely. … Consistent with the laws of war, bin Laden’s surrender
would have been accepted if feasible. 325
Even if surrender was offered, it may not have been safe for the SEAL team to immediately take
Bin Laden into custody given the presence of weapons and other threatening individuals in the
compound. That said, so long as he did not take up arms or attempt to flee, Bin Laden had he
surrendered would have remained immune from direct attack until the hostile situation was
defused. One final lingering objection to the way in which the operation was implemented
concerns the two shots fired at Bin Laden. This invokes the controversial phenomenon of
“double-tapping,” which involves using a second shot to “finish off” a combatant who has been
fully disabled by a first shot.326
In evaluating the legality of these operations, it is not enough to examine the status of the target;
the status of the attacker may also be relevant. Navy SEALs—who would be deemed privileged
combatants in an IAC—carried out the Bin Laden operation. By contrast, the drone program in
Yemen is run largely by civilians in the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center, thus signaling the
evolution of the intelligence agency into a paramilitary force.327 This actuality raises the question
of whether these state actors are entitled to engage in hostilities under IHL. If members of the
CIA involved in such an operation in an IAC were to be captured or extradited by the territorial
or nationality state, they may not be entitled to assert the defense of combatant immunity, even if
the operation were conducted lawfully under the law of war.328 According to the Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings, Summary or Arbitrary Executions:
[I]ntelligence personnel do not have immunity from prosecution under domestic
law for their conduct. They are thus unlike State armed forces which would
generally be immune from prosecution for the same conduct (assuming they
complied with IHL requirements). Thus, CIA personnel could be prosecuted for
324
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murder under the domestic law of any country in which they conduct targeted
drone killings, and could also be prosecuted for violations of applicable US
law.329
The ICRC’s study of customary IHL takes a pragmatic approach to the question of the
involvement of law enforcement and intelligence personnel in hostilities: “[w]hen these units
take part in hostilities and fulfil the criteria of armed forces, they are considered combatants.” 330
The incorporation of armed law enforcement agencies into the armed forces is normally
accomplished through a formal legislative act.331 Likewise, the ICC Statute reflects the diversity
of state actors who may engage in hostilities by discussing armed conflicts involving
“governmental authorities” rather than designating such participants as members of the “armed
forces” stricto sensu.332
As a matter of established doctrine, combat immunity is a feature of the law governing IACs that
protects privileged combatants from prosecution for lawful acts of war by another state. It does
not exist as a formal matter in the law governing NIACs, where rebels and other non-state
fighters are not privileged to use force and can be prosecuted for any acts of violence they
commit or even for mere participation in an insurrection if domestic law penalizes such
conduct.333 This asymmetry stems from the fact that NIACs historically occurred on the territory
of a single state, as in the classic civil war scenario, such that there was little risk that the state’s
own armed forces would be prosecuted for lawful acts of war. It bears consideration, however, of
whether a doctrine of combat immunity should be developed to protect privileged combatants
from being prosecuted for lawful acts of war committed in an extraterritorial NIAC. As it stands,
international law would not constrain either Pakistan or Yemen from prosecuting a U.S. soldier
or member of the CIA for committing a violent act on their territory.
4.3. Conclusion: Jus in Bello
The contention that both Bin Laden and al-Aulaqi were lawful military objectives subject to
continuous targeting authority on the basis of their status, as opposed to their activities at the
moment of their deathes, emerges as a central justification for both operations. A priori, this
position requires a theory for the applicability of IHL to the events in question. If IHL follows
our protagonists wherever engage with each other—as opposed to applying only to territory
where combat activities regularly occur—then IHL offers support for these operations. Legal
certainty in the Yemen context requires a theory for why the conflict with AQAP is either part of
the conflict against al Qaida writ large or triggers IHL on its own or in connection with some
other armed conflict being waged on the Arabian Peninsula. The conclusion of legality also
requires, at a minimum, acceptance of the ICRC’s continuous combat function concept, with a
rejection of the least-injurious-means limitation that the ICRC proposes on such targeting
329
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authority. If the two men did not occupy a combat role, however, then a more robust targeting
authority is required premised exclusively on their membership in an organized armed group.
All this analysis presumes the applicability of IHL. Outside of this framework, these events
become more suspect given non-derogable prohibitions against summary execution334 set forth in
many human rights instruments, not to mention prohibitions against murder and assassination
under relevant domestic law and the constitutional imperative of due process. The applicability
of these latter bodies of law depends, in part, on complex and contested questions of choice of
law and extraterritoriality. Indeed, even if IHL is applicable, it is not entirely settled that these
other legal regimes do not also apply in parallel. There are conflicting views on whether IHL as
the lex specialis, within the meaning of the adage lex specialis derogate legi generali (“the
special rule overrides the general law”),335 fully displaces or merely qualifies other otherwise
applicable bodies of international law, such as human rights law, in a state of armed conflict. The
next Section explores this choice of law dilemma.
5. Alternative Bodies of Law
All of the foregoing analysis assumes that IHL is the right framework from which to evaluate the
two operations. If IHL is not applicable at all, then other bodies of law rise to the fore, including
U.S. domestic law and international human rights law (IHRL) (presuming their extraterritorial
application) alongside the lex fori, Pakistani and Yemeni domestic law.336 Even if IHL has been
triggered and regulates these events, IHRL may still apply in parallel as a source of rules to fill
gaps in IHL, to interpret undefined or imprecise concepts in IHL, or even to mitigate certain
more permissive aspects of IHL.337 IHRL may be particularly relevant in regulating the conduct
of states engaged in NIACs, where rules are less developed as compared to IACs. Likewise,
elements of the relevant domestic law will continue to regulate aspects of these events in parallel
with these bodies of international law. This Section will focus primarily on the international
choice of law question, but will identify points of intersection and tension between international
and domestic law. Taken as a whole, this inquiry reveals the existence of overlapping regimes
without clear rules on resolving conflicts of law that arise.
5.1. International Human Rights
Starting with human rights law, even if IHL does apply to these events, it is not entirely clear that
IHRL is silent.338 This query invokes the vexing issue in contemporary international law of how
to resolve the normative tensions that exist at the intersection of these two bodies of law. Many
theories have been espoused in the literature and jurisprudence to resolve potential conflicts of
law that may arise at this interface. The first theory is one of lex specialis, which comes in a
334
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strong and a weak form.339 The strong form envisions a total displacement of IHRL upon the
commencement of armed conflict.340 By this view, humanitarian law and human rights law are
self-contained, mutually exclusive regimes. Where IHL does not speak to a situation, actors are
free to choose a course of action, unfettered by legal rules drawn from elsewhere.341 Gaps in the
law are deemed purposeful in a sense such that they should not be filled from other sources.
The weak form of the lex specialis theory does not envision the total displacement of
international human rights norms in armed conflict situations except where the rules of IHL and
IHRL are in direct contradiction. Where the applicable rules are not directly opposed to each
other, this approach would dictate that the two bodies of law should be harmonized342 through
interpretive techniques343 and formal declarations of derogation.344 As such, where there are gaps
in IHL, there may be other rules—including human rights norms and domestic law—that are
applicable.345 Human rights law can thus be employed as an interpretive aid to add content to
undefined terms in IHL, such as “judicial guarantees” and “humane treatment,” or to expound
upon treaty obligations, as in situations of occupation when the occupying state exercises plenary
power over territory.346 In a recent submission to the Human Rights Committee, the U.S.
acknowledged that IHL and IHRL are “complementary and mutually reinforcing.” 347 This is a
departure from prior statements that adopted a more robust lex specialis position.348
While many adherents to a lex specialis approach consider human rights to be an invasive
species vis-à-vis IHL, it cannot be gainsaid that positive IHL invites in these very norms. Thus,
many IHL treaties create space for a consideration of, or even interlineations with, human rights
norms and concerns. The Martens Clause is the precursor to this phenomenon,349 and Articles 72
and 75 of API are more modern and fulsome manifestations of this tendency. These textual
portals go far toward debunking the lex specialis maximus approach to the humanitarian
law/human rights interface. By the same measure, there are IHRL treaties that specifically make
allowances for situations governed by IHL. The European Convention on Human Rights, for

339

Coard et al v. U.S., Case 10.951, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Rep. No. 109/00, para.42 (1999); Watkin 2004, at pp.2-9.
Greenwood 2008, at p.39.
341
Parks 2010, at p.806.
342
U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31 on the Nature of the General Legal Obligation
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, adopted March 29, 2004, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004),
para.11; Legal Consequences, supra n.104, at para.106. Greenwood 2008, at p.40; Lubell 2010, at pp.193-235.
343
See Fragmentation Study, supra n.335, at para.4.
344
Article 4 of the ICCPR, for example, allows for states to derogate from certain of its provisions in times of
national emergency. See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29 of 31 August 2001 (States of
Emergency), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.1, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/71eba4be3974b4f7c1256ae200517361?Opendocument.
345
Nuclear Weapons, supra n.129, at para.26; Legal Consequences, supra n.104, at para.106.
346
Armed Activities, supra n.83, at para.178.
347
Fourth Periodic Report of the United States of American to the United Nations Committee on Human Rights
Concerning the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 20, 2011), para.507, available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/179781.htm [hereinafter ‘Fourth Periodic Report’].
348
See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Response of the US to Request for Precautionary
Measures—Detainees in Guantánamo Bay (April 15, 2002), available at
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/excep/usresp1.html.
349
Article 1(2), API.
340

44

Not for Citation or Attribution. Forthcoming: 14 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2012).

example, specifically exempts from censure “deaths resulting from lawful acts of war.” 350 This
formulation necessarily imports elements of IHL into the human rights analysis such that in a
situation of armed conflict, IHL defines what constitutes an “extrajudicial” killing.
A third approach to managing this interface rejects the idea of lex specialis and of a hierarchy of
rules altogether. Instead, it presumes that the most appropriate rule or body of law should be
applied in any particular scenario to promote “systemic integration.”351 This may result in a
sliding scale between the two bodies of law depending on the circumstances. So, activities on the
battlefield or in an active theater of hostilities may be governed almost exclusively by IHL, but
human rights law may have more to say vis-à-vis detention practices in light of its detailed rules
on conditions of confinement and judicial protections. Thus, the applicability of IHL is not
necessarily binary, in the sense that the corpus of IHL either applies in its entirety to an incident,
territory, or individual, or not at all. Finally, one can envision a reverse lex specialis
prioritization, where by international human rights norms temper elements of classic IHL. This
may be due to the fact that many human rights norms constitute later in time legal
pronouncements.352 Or, it may be by virtue of human rights rules’ strong normative force.353 This
latter approach might demand the additive application of applicable rules to ensure maximum
protection to the individual.354
Most courts and commentators have adopted a harmonizing approach to this question. The ICJ,
for example, stated that IHL as the lex specialis would determine whether a particular killing was
“arbitrary”:
The test of what is arbitrary deprivation of life, however, … falls to be determined
by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict is
which designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a particular
loss of life … is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to
Article 6 of the Covenant [on Civil and Political Rights], can only be decided by
reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms
of the Covenant itself.355
Even the former Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killing, Summary on Arbitrary Executions
conceded that targeted killing can be lawful in the context of IHL: “[A]though in most
circumstances targeted killings violate the right to life, in the exceptional circumstances of armed
conflict, they may be legal.”356 This conclusion reveals the importance of the a priori question of
the applicability of IHL and the existence of a predicate armed conflict.
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Resolving the conflict of law question is not the only impediment to applying human rights
norms to these events. In many of today’s conflict situations—especially transnational conflicts
involving the U.S.—theories for the pertinence of human rights law also presume the
extraterritorial application of states’ IHR obligations.357 This remains contested, especially by the
U.S., which until recently could have been described as a persistent objector to the proposition
that such extraterritorial obligations exist. This position, however, is increasingly out of step with
the caselaw.358 At a minimum, the current state of the law would dictate that human rights norms
apply wherever a state exercises de facto control over territory (including in the sense of
undertaking governmental functions)359 or individuals.360 An argument could be made that Bin
Laden was in—or could easily have been brought into—the effective control of the SEAL team.
It is more difficult to argue that al-Aulaqi was within the effective control of the U.S. since he
was killed from a distance, without actually being physically in the hands of state agents.361 If
this distinction is valid, state responsibility under IHRL could turn on the way in which an
individual was killed, rather than the question of whether state exercised control over the
individual’s life. Any requirement of physical custody for showing effective control, however,
offers a perverse loophole for states to avoid their human rights violations by operating
remotely.362
Turning to the content of IHRL, most human rights instruments contain a broad articulation of
the right to life,363 although some treaties qualify the formulation of this right by prohibiting only
the “arbitrary” deprivation of life.364 Furthermore, this right is considered non-derogable except
when a sovereign employs deadly force in situations of self-defense, to otherwise protect life, or
to prevent the escape of a dangerous suspect.365 State actors can thus employ deadly force in law
enforcement actions only when the target poses an immediate danger to the arresting officer.366
The European Court of Human Rights has mandated a strict test of necessity be employed to
determine if lethal force is warranted; there must also be proportionality between the state’s
357
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response and the perceived threat, and alternatives to lethal force must be considered.367
Generally, law enforcement personnel are expected to offer warnings and attempt apprehension
before resorting to deadly force.368
Theoretically, the right to life adheres even in situations of armed conflict. Indeed, the former
U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions concluded that
“extrajudicial executions can never be justified under any circumstances, not even in time of
war.”369 Accordingly, the Rapporteur decried the first airstrike in Yemen in 2002 as “a clear case
of extrajudicial killing.”370 Nonetheless, assuming the applicability of both bodies of law, the
human right regime may cede regulatory authority to the jus in bello, which—as discussed
above—can be interpreted to characterize the two killings as lawful wartime killings of the
enemy.371
This analysis reaches a contrary conclusion if IHL is removed from consideration. If there is no
armed conflict, and the jus ad bellum self-defense justification governs the decision to use
military force, international human rights law continues to protect individuals from arbitrary
deprivations of life. The lex specialis debate is less conceptually salient in the literature when
only the jus ad bellum is applicable. In the operations under consideration, the degree of force
employed exceeded that which would be acceptable under a law enforcement framework
(although the Bin Laden raid is a closer call in light of the inherent dangerousness of the
situation that day372). It is unclear, however, if jus-ad-bellum operations targeting a single
dangerous individual should be analyzed as law enforcement operations or if some other
harmonization of IHR and the jus ad bellum is necessary. Certainly there is some role for IHRL
to play here, particularly to protect civilians from harm in light in the absence of a concept of
collateral damage outside of situations of armed conflict.
There are multiple theories for how the law governing the use of force and human rights law
interact. In particular, there will be situations in counterterrorism operations, such as the events
in question, when the jus ad bellum, the jus in bello, and IHRL simply cannot be perfectly
367
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harmonized because the two bodies of law permit forms of action or impose obligations and
restraints that are inherently incompatible. In such situations, it comes down to a pragmatic
policy choice by the state as to which body of rules to follow. This choice is, of course, subject to
the recognition that the state will have to accept any consequences, even if just reputational, for
having breached an equally applicable legal obligation.
5.2. Domestic Law
As this article is primarily focused on international law, a full treatment of the domestic law
implications of these operations is beyond its scope. It is worth simply highlighting several
considerations that would be relevant to synchronizing the jus in bello considerations discussed
above with U.S. statutory and constitutional law and with the lex fori.
5.2.1. U.S. Domestic Law
There are several elements of U.S. domestic law that might govern the events in question. Most
saliently, the U.S. has banned assassination as a matter of national policy through an iterative
series of executive orders, the last of which remains extant.373 In the wake of alleged peacetime
assassination plots against foreign leaders in the 1960s and 1970s, 374 U.S. Presidents Gerald
Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan issued executive orders (E.O. 11905 (1976),375 E.O.
12036 (1978),376 and E.O. 12333 (1981),377 respectively) banning assassination without
Presidential approval. E.O. 12333, for example, provides:
No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall
engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.
Over the years, legislation has been introduced to fortify378 or limit379 the express prohibition
against assassination in these decrees, but nothing has been enacted to date. Indeed, the
Executive Order was likely passed originally in order to head off a legislative ban.
In an exercise of concerted ambiguity, none of the E.O.s actually defines assassination, although
“the context in which [the first order] was promulgated suggests that it was understood to apply
to circumstances similar to those that recently had been the subject of investigation.”380
Colloquially, the concept of assassination—which carries a distinctly negative connotation—
encompasses the intentional and premeditated killing of a particular individual (often a
government official, influential civilian, or other prominent figure) for political purposes. To
many, it embodies a notion of treachery381 as in death by poison cigar or exploding umbrella.382
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This element of a betrayal of trust is not, however, inherent to the concept. The full reach of the
Order has been the subject of speculation given recent events, such as with respect to the
bombing of Libya in 1986383 or calls to eliminate Saddam Hussein in the first Gulf War.384
For our purposes, the ban on assassination must be reconciled with the use of lethal force in the
context of armed conflicts, counterinsurgency operations, and counterterrorism measures taken
in self-defense. In its broadest terms, the Executive Order could be interpreted to mean that the
U.S. cannot kill a pre-selected individual under any circumstances. In the alternative, the ban
may remain applicable unless there is a valid authorization to use force emanating from
Congress.385 Another interpretation would exclude the Order’s applicability in wartime
altogether on the basis of the argument that it applies to intelligence rather than military
activities.386 To this end, the U.S. executive orders have been interpreted to apply only in
peacetime or, at a minimum, to embody implicit exceptions in conventional military,
counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism operations.387 Col. W. Hays Parks, when he was Special
Assistant for Law of War Matters to the Judge Advocate General of the Army, concluded that
clandestine, low visibility or overt use of military force against legitimate targets
in time of war, or against similar targets in time of peace where such individuals
or groups pose an immediate threat to US citizens or the national security of the
US, as determined by competent authority, does not constitute assassination or
conspiracy to engage in assassination, and would not be prohibited by the
proscription in EO 12333 or by international law.388
The classic historical example cited is the downing of the aircraft carrying Japanese Admiral
Yamamoto Isoroku in 1943 far from any battlefield.389 By this reasoning, the killing of the head
of an organized armed force, even in a NIAC, would be governed by IHL as a form of lex
specialis rather than the assassination ban. Even if some ban on assassination exists in IHL, it
likely covers the killing of senior officers by treachery or trickery, which would not be the case
where uniformed SEALs and remote attacks are involved.
Although outside the scope of this study, there is no question that other foundational elements of
domestic law, such as the 4th and 5th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, may speak to these
events. Indeed, it is also worth considering whether these protections may be more robust vis-àvis al-Aulaqi as a U.S. citizen, even though the 5th Amendment clearly applies to all persons and
not just citizens. There is early precedent suggesting that citizenship might be relevant to
determining the sliding scale between the law of war and domestic law (at least when it comes to
382
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the reach of military jurisdiction), but the issue of the rights of non-citizens was not squarely
presented.390 A devotion to universal human rights principles, however, might counsel against
asserting any distinction between the two operations based on citizenship alone. The strength of
constitutional protections may also turn on whether these events are perceived to have occurred
on a battlefield. Indeed, in Hamdi, the Supreme Court specifically distinguished between actions
“on the battlefield” against a U.S. citizen and the detention of that citizen, which “meddles little,
if at all, in the strategy or conduct of war.”391 At the same time, prudential doctrines—such as the
political question doctrine—may intrude to neutralize any potential constitutional claims arising
out of these events.392 All this said, assuming the parallel applicability of IHL, a robust lex
specialis conclusion could theoretically override any limitations imposed by the 5th Amendment
due process clause.393 Absent a strong theory of lex specialis, the due process clause may
mitigate the more permissive aspects of IHL, particularly outside of a “hot” conflict situation,
which will be discussed in greater detail in the next Section.
5.2.2. Pakistani and Yemeni Law
It must not be forgotten that the law of the territorial state continues to apply to the actions of
foreign states within its borders. Standard penal prohibitions against murder and mayhem would
govern the events in question absent displacement by the jus ad bellum or IHL as the lex
specialis. One can imagine a counter-factual scenario in which one of the SEALs was captured
by Pakistani forces and prosecuted for murder. That defendant would no doubt invoke combat
immunity as a defense (along with individual self-defense perhaps). Pakistani jurists, however,
would be under no international law obligation to recognize the defense in this NIAC context,
especially given that the U.S. was employing forcible measures without Pakistan’s consent.
Because it was launched remotely, the Al-Aulaqi operation would not likely yield a prosecutable
defendant, unless the base itself was located in Yemen. In any case, these contingencies are all
extremely unlikely, given the state of the United States’ relations with these two countries and
the high profile nature of the targets.394
5.3. Conclusion: Domestic Law
It is, of course, unlikely that the U.S. would ever actually apply the assassination ban to the
events in question, even if it were applicable. In any case, there is an authoritative interpretation
of the Executive Order that suggests it is meant to govern peacetime killings of public figures
rather than wartime killings of military objectives. Pakistani and Yemeni law continue to apply
to these events. Even though the operations might be lawful under international law, there would
be no bar to Pakistan or Yemen prosecuting one of the actors involved if custody could be
obtained absent a doctrine of combatant immunity in the law governing NIACs.
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6. Locating a Duty to Capture In International or Domestic Law
These operations have given rise to the claim that the U.S. was under a duty to endeavor to
capture Bin Laden and/or al-Aulaqi in lieu of killing them outright, especially given that neither
was confronted on a “hot” battlefield. There are a number of places in this international law
schema where one might locate such an obligation, especially given the fuzziness of the
interfaces between the relevant legal regimes and the potential for normative overlap. Within the
jus ad bellum, the proportionality requirement inherent to the customary doctrine of self-defense
may demand capture in certain circumstances when a state is addressing a threat posed by a
single individual rather than by a sovereign entity, military installment, hostile force, or combat
asset. This may especially be the case when the individual is found outside of an established
battlefield. Similarly, the necessity requirement might place limits on the robustness of defensive
action where capture is feasible. Relevant considerations may include the strength of the
relationship between the targeting state and the territorial state, the dependability of the territorial
state as a partner in effectuating capture, and the sophistication of the intelligence, technology,
and military assets that the targeting state has at its disposal (bearing in mind the debate over
whether international law creates relative obligations among nations depending on their level of
development). Indeed it could be argued that where the territorial state has consented to foreign
intervention, there is a greater duty to attempt to capture rather than kill an individual, in light of
the potential to gain cooperation and assistance from local law enforcement officials. At the
same time, a state such as Yemen may be more willing to allow a remotely-piloted vehicle to
enter its airspace than troops on its territory. Alternatively, it could be argued that where the
exercise of self-defense is reactive (as in following a completed armed attack) or strictly
preventative (as in the face of an inchoate threat, rather than imminent attack), international
law—through the principles of necessity or proportionality—imposes heightened restrictions on
the lethality of any defensive response.
Within the jus in bello and the rules governing NIACs, the ICRC’s theory of least restrictive
means might not countenance resort to lethal force unless the target is engaged while directly
participating in hostilities, even if the individual is a member of an organized armed group who
has assumed a continuous combat function in the group. In addition, the right to use lethal force
might be limited by principles of military necessity, proportionality, or humanity in out-oftheater situations. Thus, while a state may be entitled to directly target a non-state fighter who is
in the process of attacking national forces, armed forces may be limited to less injurious means
when confronting an unarmed fighter who is not posing an immediate threat.
Human rights norms—and particularly the more robust version of proportionality governing law
enforcement scenarios—might temper the jus ad bellum or IHL’s targeting rules when an
operation is undertaken outside of actual combat. In particular, the principle of military necessity
might dictate the use of less than lethal means in such a scenario because it is difficult to argue
that the killing (as opposed to capture) of fighters is “indispensable” under the circumstances.395
Turning to domestic law, while the assassination ban is likely inapposite here, it remains to be
fully explored whether the 5th Amendment due process clause, a fortiori with respect to al395
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Aulaqi, might impose any limits along the lines of the Israeli Supreme Court’s conclusion in the
Targeted Killing opinion.396 This may be especially true when chargeable crimes—such as
terrorism or treason—exist in domestic law. In short, there are places within this journey to
legality where an authoritative decision maker might impose heightened obligations on a state
actor to endeavor to capture rather than kill an individual posing a threat to the nation.
The argument that members of such groups may be targeted wherever they are may be palatable
when dealing with embattled foreign lands. It may be more problematic when applied to
individuals found on U.S. soil—a scenario not presented by the two operations under
consideration but logically foreseeable. Any arguments employed to justify unrestricted targeting
of enemy combatants abroad with lethal force could be domesticated with little effort. And yet,
the application of a pure law-of-war framework to alleged members of al Qaida apprehended in
the U.S. has been controversial and remains the subject of litigation. In the face of legal
challenge, the executive branch has eventually foregone detention and charged such individuals
in Article III courts with violations of Title 18 of the U.S. Code.397 As a result, whether or not the
U.S. Constitution or any other source of law places limits on the application of IHL to
exclusively domestic events in the absence of an armed conflict on U.S. territory has never been
fully tested.
7. Conclusion
This epistemological journey has revealed multiple bodies of law under intense pressure from
exogenous forces of globalization and the metastasis of transnational terrorism. The relevant law
is unclear, indeterminate, or in flux at many key junctures along the way to a finding of legality
vis-à-vis the two events in question. Thus, there is no definitive answer to the question of
whether the doctrine of self-defense provides a justification for both the incursion into Pakistani
sovereign territory and the use of deadly force against an individual posing an expected but
inchoate threat to a nation. Likewise, assuming a self-defense rationale alone is insufficient or
unavailable to justify both operations, IHL offers another source of potential authority. This,
however, assumes that IHL follows militants wherever they may go, even if they journey far
from the combat activities that activated this body of law in the first place. Nor is it certain that
there is continuous targeting authority over individuals whom the core IHL treaties would
classify as civilians, targetable only when directly participating in hostilities. The claim to
legality requires an acceptance of the ICRC’s continuous combat function construct—whose
reach and limiting principles remain subject to debate—or a more robust targeting theory
equating fighters in NIACs to privileged combatants in IACs. Finally, if there is an obligation to
endeavor to capture a dangerous individual before killing him or her, from whence does such an
obligation flow—the jus ad bellum, IHL, IHRL, or domestic law principles of proportionality
and due process?
Determining the legality of these events also requires a consideration of the normative
relationship between multiple potentially applicable bodies of law, including the jus ad bellum,
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the jus in bello, and human rights law. While it has been argued that IHL displaces IHRL, IHL
may also displace other targeting theories, such as national self-defense, as independent
rationales for these types of operations. Most of the debate on doctrinal hierarchies has focused
on when and to what degree IHRL constrains actors engaged in armed conflicts governed by
IHL; as such, there is little to suggest that IHRL does not apply in full force to pure self-defense
operations absent a state of armed conflict.
This legal indeterminacy and doctrinal overlap has been lamented as a consequence of the
“fragmentation” of international law.398 This is, however, an inapt metaphor as it presumes a
primordial whole that has since disintegrated. The fact that multiple conclusions on legality are
possible is more likely due to the fact that modern conflicts and counterterrorism operations—
which take place transnationally and outside of traditional theaters of war against non-state
actors who countenance no limitations on their own actions whatsoever—generate novel legal
questions that invoke multiple legal regimes. Secondary rules of recognition, interpretation, and
choice of law have yet to catch up. Furthermore, notwithstanding the evolution of today’s acute
threats to world order, it has been decades since the existing IHL treaties were negotiated and
drafted.
In all systems of law, regulatory gaps produce legal uncertainty but also a freedom to act. Thus,
in the absence of clear legal rules, states are—in essence—free to choose a course of action. This
suggests that while jurisprudentially discredited,399 the legal legacy of the Lotus case—which set
forth the proposition that what is not expressly forbidden by international law is permitted—
continues to exert a strong gravitational pull.400 There may, however, be consequences to acting
along the edge of the law even in the absence of clear proscriptions, mandatory jurisdiction,
and robust enforcement institutions. Negative repercussions may be diplomatic, reputational, and
political. Furthermore, there remains the risk that where international reaction to controversial
events is muted—for whatever reason—customary international law may evolve in ways that are
ultimately undesirable.401
These observations also have implications for whether states should—as a matter of legal
obligation or prudence—justify their actions when they choose to operate on the outer bounds of
positive law.402 On the one hand, it could be argued that legal indeterminacy behooves
governments to provide insight into the relevant facts, legal theories, and analyses—consistent
with national security concerns—so that the international community can evaluate the state’s
claims to legality and shape the development of law with their reaction. The remarks by
Brennan403 and Koh404 reflect this approach, although the reported withholding of the
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justificatory al-Aulaqi memorandum suggests a contrary impulse.405 On the other hand, of
course, enabling such scrutiny may aid the enemy by revealing means and methods of war; it
may also generate statements against interest in the event that a judicial forum does eventually
assert jurisdiction over some aspect of a controversial operation. Moreover, states are not
monolithic entities, and it may be impossible to formulate a definitive legal theory justifying
actions of this nature.406 Articulating the legal, factual, and political basis for engaging in
controversial conduct, however, will go far toward ensuring that such actions are treated as
exceptional rather than precedential.
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